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Asian Development Bank also questions 
whether the current development model 
can work, given the statistics on poverty, 
and is calling for a change in course toward 
integrated growth that is no longer meas-
ured solely by GDP and average income.
This magazine provides a forum for 
the voices of authors from various Asian 
countries to express their thoughts on pos-
sible development models for the region 
that could achieve prosperity for all, with-
out doing long-term damage to nature or 
threatening the subsistence of entire popu-
lations.
In his article, Chandran Nair from Hong 
Kong cautions that Asia should not adopt 
Western standards of consumption. He 
advocates for Asians to seek their own path 
of development that would above all regu-
late the exploitation of resources. Chinese 
sociologist Qin Hui sees the solution to the 
worldwide environmental crisis in rigor-
ous globalization, in which states not only 
integrate their markets into a globally net-
worked economy, but also set democratic 
standards that would serve to globalize both 
environmental protection and social justice. 
Philippine social scientist Bonn Juego con-
tributes a critical analysis of the growth-ori-
ented economic vision of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, which, in his view, 
leads to an even greater marginalization of 
poor populations in the region.
From Pakistan comes the idea of an 
Islamic welfare state, and the article from 
India illustrates how contentious the issue 
of growth and development models on the 
subcontinent can be.
Authors writing from the poorest coun-
tries in the region – Laos, Myanmar, and 
Cambodia – are particularly critical of the 
traditional growth model and point out 
its shortcomings. Their assessment is that 
it produces far too many losers, with one 
example being how that growth model often 
leaves the cultural rights of indigenous pop-
ulations by the wayside.
In addition to the articles on develop-
ment prospects for Asia, we have also gath-
ered together here voices of people from 
China, India, Pakistan, and Myanmar, who 
describe their visions of a good life. For most 
of those surveyed, material goods were not 
Since the beginning of this millennium, Asia 
has become the growth engine of the world. 
Today, Asian economies already generate 
about 40 percent of global GDP, and the 
upward trend continues, despite a slow-
down of growth in China and India. It is not 
only economic power that is on the rise; the 
average per capita income in Asia has tri-
pled since 1990, and the number of people 
living in poverty has declined by half in the 
same time period.
Nonetheless, two-thirds of the world’s 
poor live in Asia, and more people suffer 
from hunger there than anywhere else in 
the world. The most recent estimates by 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) indi-
cate that some 660 million Asians live on 
less than $1.25 per day. If we include people 
whose subsistence is under constant threat, 
then every other person in the region lives 
on the brink of poverty.
Extensive investment in infrastructure, 
education, and social welfare systems is 
still necessary almost everywhere in Asia in 
order to improve the situation for individu-
als, or to allow people to create and share 
in the prosperity exemplified by Western 
societies. How can that money be gener-
ated and what effect will that have on global 
development? Will our planet’s capacity be 
sufficient to allow the current four billion 
people in Asia – or the nine billion people 
expected to populate the Earth by 2050 – to 
enjoy a life of dignity and without poverty?
«Many factors indicate that we have 
reached a turning point in the development 
of the Western growth model. Continuing 
on the path we have followed to date has 
no future.» This was the determination of 
the German government’s Commission of 
Inquiry in its final report, issued in 2013. The 
Introduction
at the top of their wish lists, but rather better 
access to education, a more tolerant and secure 
society, and equality of the sexes.
Development policies in Asia will have 
enormous relevance for the rest of the world. 
This magazine is an invitation to readers to 
familiarize themselves with the issues under 
discussion and gain insight into the debates 
being conducted in the region.
Katrin Altmeyer
Head of Asia Department
2 3Introduction Introduction
Chandran Nair s the founder and  
CEO of the Global Institute  
For Tomorrow (GIFT), a think 
tank dedicated to advancing  
an understanding of the impacts 
of globalization. He is the  
author of Consumptionomics: 
Asia’s Role in Reshaping  
Capitalism and Saving the Planet, 
which calls for a new approach  
to growth and development  
in the emerging Asian economies. 
Current Growth Debates in Asia
How They Miss the Point
Chandran Nair
measured by GDP, is good, and that there-
fore high GDP growth is what countries 
should aim for.
So the so-called debate is really a disa-
greement over a very narrow issue – will 
Asian countries continue to grow as quickly 
as everyone has come to expect? This is 
seen as all the more important now that 
shaky Western economies have increasingly 
pinned their hopes on the emergence of bil-
lions of new consumers to bolster demand 
for their goods. Throughout all this, the real 
questions people should be asking are never 
mentioned. Why is high growth the target in 
the first place, and what is the true price of 
consumption-led growth? Or should 5 to 
6 billion Asians in 2050 aspire to live like 
people in the West – and is it even possible?
How did we get here?
The notion that growth is good is presented 
as a god-given fact, but it is really a conse-
quence of a particular ideology, often called 
«free-market capitalism.» This is an ideology 
that stresses individual rights but ignores 
collective welfare, focuses on short-term 
gains rather than long-term damages, and 
creates an illusion of progress by hiding 
the true costs of consumption. It is also the 
ideology that was pushed on Asian govern-
ments throughout the latter half of the 20th 
century.
For the better part of 50 years, Asian 
states were told that the path to develop-
ment follows the establishment of market 
economies, opening up to trade with – and 
investment from – the rest of the world, 
with the rule of law protecting property 
and contracts, and, ideally, with democratic 
elections being held. The payoff would be 
not only increased prosperity but also 
improved transparency and accountabil-
ity, better governance, less corruption, and 
greater individual freedom. They were told, 
in sum, that not only could free markets 
help make everyone richer, they could also 
help them be better.
Much as the shape of the American 
financial system was determined by its 
banks and other institutions – which spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars on lobby-
ing to free themselves of regulatory con-
straints – so too across Asia did Western and 
Asian businesses alike lobby to be allowed 
to act as freely as possible. In many cases, 
they did not have to do much persuading. 
Most Asian governments were desperate for 
the approval of the Western world and the 
chance to finally take their seat at the table – 
a fact supposedly exploited by international 
institutions (which always happened to be 
Western-run), such as the World Bank and 
the World Trade Organization, with «advi-
sory» missions to Asian governments and 
report cards that praised economies that 
had liberalized while criticizing backsliders.
Superficially, the results were promising. 
Export-oriented Asian economies boomed, 
and with growing levels of affluence came 
hundreds of millions of Asians able to afford a 
new life of abundance. But the lie at the heart 
of free-market capitalism is that the benefits 
that flow to corporations and, to a lesser 
extent, the general population are a direct 
result of continuing to evade the true envi-
ronmental and social costs of consumption.
As much as markets are extremely effec-
tive at doing some things, such as lifting 
hundreds of millions of people in China 
out of poverty, they are also extremely bad 
at doing others, such as properly reflecting 
the true price of the vast majority of goods 
and services we consume. To take just one 
example, markets will never – on their own 
accord – factor into the price of timber the 
cost of the damage done to the environ-
ment from collecting it, or the further dam-
age that is done to the atmosphere if it is 
burned. The plain truth is that companies 
have every incentive not to pay for the dam-
age they do, because doing so would drasti-
cally increase their production costs – and 
yield no benefits for them. In many cases, 
this behavior is justified with the argument 
that the company’s savings are passed on to 
us, their customers.
Of course, the truth is that we still pay 
the full price of the timber we consume – 
it is just that we do so in the form of rap-
idly shrinking forests, polluted air, and the 
desertification of large parts of the Earth – 
even as the artificially low cash value of 
timber encourages us to consume far more 
than we should. And what is true of timber 
is true of oil, food, fisheries, electricity, and 
practically everything else we consume. The 
market is even worse at valuing some of our 
most precious resources, such as clean air 
and water, because they are largely free. 
The result is that the average American con-
sumes more than three times the amount of 
water than the average Chinese, and more 
than one hundred times more than the 
average Angolan.
In this article, Chandran Nair argues 
that Asia cannot and should not  
attempt to replicate the Western  
consumption-led economic model, which 
thrives on undervaluing resources.  
He calls for Asian governments to reject 
this model and adopt policies  
that reshape capitalism and challenge  
the Western liberal narrative of growth 
and development.
Most of the debates about Asia revolve 
around its critical and turbo-charged con-
tribution to the global economy over the 
last two decades. Many of the discussions 
are also tinged with disbelief at the fast rates 
of growth, which can only be dreamt about 
in the developed world.
China is often the center of attention 
in these discussions, which then swiftly 
descend into sweeping statements about 
the shift of economic power from the West 
to the East and even hubristic ideas about 
an «Asian century» – whatever that means. 
A lot of this passes as conventional wisdom 
and therefore sits comfortably with Asian 
politicians and business leaders.
What is often missing in these debates 
is a bit more intellectual honesty to lay bare 
the ugly underbelly of the consequences 
of unfettered growth at all costs. This is the 
false promise that conveniently ignores the 
high price being paid through subservience 
to consumption-led economic growth poli-
cies, which are in turn reliant on the under-
valuing of resources and the externalization 
of true costs.
The problem is that those on both sides 
of the debate – both the bulls and the bears – 
share the same key assumption. They all 
take it as a given that economic growth, as 
Asian governments remain persuaded enough of 
the benefits of the free market to continue to allow 
traditional practices to be pushed aside.
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lion. It will likely be 6 billion by 2050. The 
consequences of a full-scale emulation of 
20th century Western habits of consump-
tion by this number of people would be cat-
astrophic. Which means that, ironically, the 
pundits are correct to say that whatever hap-
pens in Asia will determine what happens in 
the rest of the world in the 21st century.
To take just one example, there are cur-
rently a billion cars on the road.2 More than 
60 percent of oil produced in the world 
already goes toward transportation.3 Were 
China and India to reach Western levels of 
car ownership, as they are currently being 
actively encouraged to do, they would have 
two billion cars between them.4 Just keep-
ing that number of cars on the road would 
require 120 million barrels of oil a day, four 
times OPEC’s current output,5 to say noth-
ing of the disastrous effects that a total of 
three billion cars would have on the envi-
ronment and infrastructure.
To return to the earlier example of meat 
consumption, equally important is the 
choice Asia decides to make regarding its 
approach to agriculture. The same agricul-
tural chemicals that prevented mass star-
vation in the developing world during the 
so-called Green Revolution are now being 
overused to the point where they are actu-
ally damaging the fertility of huge swathes 
of agriculture land.
The broad-based dependence of today’s 
agriculture on chemicals often comes as a 
shock to the uninitiated. The agrochemical 
industry is worth an estimated $125 billion 
a year worldwide – an amount that may 
double within the next five years.6 (By com-
parison, India and China spend just $60 bil-
lion educating a combined 36 percent of the 
world’s population.7)
Fertilizer use has increased by a factor of 
five worldwide since 1960. It has increased 
by a factor of 55 in China, where 1.3 mil-
lion tons of pesticides are also used every 
year. In India, levels of fertilizer application 
have risen from less than 1 kg per hectare in 
1951 to 133 kg in 2011.8 As a result, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations estimates that a staggering 25 per-
cent of the world’s total landmass is highly 
degraded9 – including 50 percent of India’s 
land10 and 37 percent of China’s.11
The social costs of overconsumption 
are equally great. The forced urbanization 
of hundreds of millions of Asians is driven 
in large part by the false belief that more 
city-dwellers will mean more middle-class 
consumers. As a result, 60 million people 
will be added to slums this decade on top 
of the 825 million already living in such 
places. And, despite being home to just over 
half the world’s population, cities account 
for more than 70 percent of its waste12 and 
greenhouse gases.13
The flip side is that the billions of Asians 
who continue to reside in rural areas are 
largely neglected. In China, for example, 
less than 10 percent of government spend-
ing in the 1980s and 1990s was allocated to 
the rural economy, despite the fact that the 
rural economy supported 75 percent of its 
people.14 In India, 400 million rural citizens 
have no electricity in their homes.15
Adhering to current policies of consump-
tion-fueled growth has brought middle-class 
affluence to many people across Asia – prob-
ably hundreds of millions, and perhaps even 
more. But their ranks will be far outnum-
bered by the many more across the region – 
especially those living in rural areas or recent 
migrants to Asia’s ever-growing number of 
megacities – whose lives will be devastated by 
a lack of water and desertification, extreme 
weather, rising sea levels, and the other 
impacts of climate change and environmen-
tal degradation. For them, the era of Ameri-
can-style consumption will never arrive.
Why technology is not  
the answer
At this juncture it is worth briefly men-
tioning technology, which has become the 
modern deus ex machina whenever we 
are confronted with problems that require 
difficult solutions. Technology will almost 
certainly be a key part of creating a sustain-
able future, but it will not be the only part. 
Technology will certainly not produce the 
results we want if we continue to invest 
hundreds of times more money into ever-
more destructive methods of consumption, 
such as fracking, than we do into sustain-
able technologies such as renewable energy, 
carbon capture, and energy-efficient indus-
try. It is also worth remembering that the 
technological revolutions of the past have 
been based on the discovery or exploitation 
of new resources, such as the revolution in 
production brought about by the advent of 
coal-powered industry, or the revolution in 
agriculture that came from the invention of 
chemical fertilizers. It remains to be seen 
what technology will be able to do if our 
resources run out.
As a result of its embrace of Western eco-
nomic models, this overconsumption has 
spread to Asia as well. In India, still home to a 
significant number of undernourished peo-
ple, well over half of the women between the 
ages of 20 and 69 years old are overweight. In 
China, the number of people considered to 
be clinically obese is approaching 90 million 
people, with forecasts suggesting the num-
ber will rise to 200 million by 2015. Within 
two decades, two out of three people in the 
country will be overweight or obese, the 
same proportion as in the United States now.1
Asian governments remain persuaded 
enough of the benefits of the free market 
to continue to allow traditional practices, 
often frugal ones, to be pushed aside. In 
India, more and more people are replac-
ing vegetarian diets with meat ones, much 
to the satisfaction of the food industry. 
Average meat consumption per person 
is currently six grams a day; the Ministry 
of Food Processing Industries sees that 
rising to 50 grams within a decade or so. 
«When such a phenomenal increase in 
meat consumption occurs,» says a minis-
try spokesperson, «the sector will witness a 
tremendous growth.»
Why any of this matters – 
Asia and the world
It is precisely this «tremendous growth» that 
we should be worried about. What free-
market advocates simply refuse to either 
accept or acknowledge is that the economic 
model they revere more or less works only 
when a relatively small proportion of the 
world population is using it. Asia’s popula-
tion, by contrast, is currently well over 4 bil-
Whatever happens in Asia will determine what  
happens in the rest of the world in the 21st century.
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tural waste in many rural areas and enable 
farmers to produce value-added foodstuffs 
that consumers pay a premium for. Rural 
areas would no longer be considered back-
waters for poor and uneducated people but 
would be seen as places with a future and 
central to the national economy.
But it will not be enough for govern-
ments to simply impose top-down policies 
and hope that corporations and individu-
als abide by them. What is required is also a 
more fundamental reframing of the public 
debate so that the current generation will be 
able to recognize and confront the key chal-
lenges of the 21st century. This will involve 
scientists in Asia ensuring that their research 
is disseminated to the public through 
research institutes and the institutions of 
higher learning. They will need to cooperate 
with political institutions and the media so 
that the public become aware of their results 
and that these are reflected in policy.
Business schools will also need a new 
curriculum that properly equips students 
with an understanding of economic his-
tory and policy rather than inculcating into 
them long-discredited ideas about efficient 
markets. Young people must be given the 
intellectual tools to come up with solu-
tions and then given the power to imple-
ment them. A less hierarchical corporate 
structure would be a good start. For all that 
the West purports to stand for democracy, 
it also tolerates an unabashedly dictato-
rial corporate system where junior staff 
have absolutely no say in setting company 
policy. This is not a model that can accom-
modate the kind of drastic changes in cor-
porate structure and culture that must be 
implemented if continued environmental 
destruction is to be avoided.
What, then, is to be done?
The problems confronting us today are 
many. The efforts to find a solution must 
likewise be many. On the policy front, 
one obvious solution would be for mar-
kets to be more properly regulated. This 
is nothing new, but the vast majority of 
regulation has been either ineffectual or 
misguided. In many countries, regulation 
with respect to automobiles places a floor 
on a vehicle’s fuel efficiency, but no major 
country places a limit on the number of 
cars allowed on the road. Similarly, the 
majority of chemical manufacturers follow 
strict guidelines regarding their produc-
tion processes to ensure the safety of their 
products, but no nation limits the total 
amount of harmful chemicals it allows to 
be produced and dispersed into the envi-
ronment. This kind of regulation is rather 
like missing the forest through the trees. 
Governments must take an honest look at 
the sustainability of current levels of pro-
duction and place appropriate constraints 
on society where necessary.
The misguided forced-urbanization 
policies of governments must likewise be 
reversed. They should be replaced instead 
with an effort to create rural areas that are 
linked to cities by outstanding infrastruc-
ture. Investment in transport, irrigation, 
communication, and storage would elimi-
nate the appallingly high levels of agricul-
Young people must be given the intellectual  
tools to come up with solutions and then given the 
power to implement them.
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The fact that such solutions exist is cause 
for optimism. However, as with any addic-
tion, the first step is acknowledging the 
problem. When it comes to our addiction 
to consumption, the treatment is no differ-
ent. Government and business leaders must 
have the courage to wake up and face the 
reality of the situation before any real pro-
gress can be made. 
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From 9 o’clock in the morning until 7 o’clock in the evening, Mr. and Mrs. Lau, both in their early 40s, collect  
batteries, electric motors, wire, and other waste materials to recycle and resell. At their tiny warehouse  
space in Mongkok, one of Hong Kong’s most crowded districts, Mr. Lau repairs whatever equipment he can,  
then sells it along with the other materials the couple has gathered to nearby hardware stores and garages.
hong kong Despite the smell and the dirt, every day the couple makes an effort to find time to  
eat and watch television together in what after 20 years has become their  
sanctuary. «Sometimes life is hard, but I’m the big boss of our ‹cozy› cave, and here 
we can live our lives in our own way,» says Mr. Lau.
Dr. Bonn Juego, a Filipino 
scientist, wrote his PhD disser- 
tation on the political economy 
of capitalist development in 
contemporary Southeast Asia. 
Currently, he is a postdoctoral 
researcher at the Department of 
Asian and International Studies, 
City University of Hong Kong, 
and a guest researcher at Global 
Development Studies, Aalborg 
University, Denmark.
The ASEAN Economic Community Project
Accumulating Capital, Dispossessing the Commons
Bonn Juego
foundation of all the regional integration 
declarations and plans of action. It serves 
as a legally binding agreement among the 
10 member states of Brunei, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Phil-
ippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
At the heart of the envisioned ASEAN Com-
munity is the expressed commitment to the 
creation of a highly competitive and glob-
ally integrated ASEAN Economic Commu-
nity (AEC) by 2015 – whose blueprint was 
adopted in 2007 – through the establish-
ment of norms, rules, and institutions of 
free-market capitalism for goods, services, 
investments, money, and labor.4
Two years before 2015, academic debates 
and policy analyses have mostly centered on 
the questions of how, why, and why not AEC 
targets will be realized. On the one hand, the 
ASEAN Secretariat continues to coordinate 
implementation mechanisms and remains 
relatively upbeat, or at least hopeful, about 
the integration goals, noting recently that 
ASEAN has already implemented «79.7 per-
cent of measures under the AEC Blueprint 
as of 15 August 2013.»5 On the other hand, 
several analysts have assessed serious con-
straints on deepening the AEC process due 
to a combination of complex and interde-
pendent factors, such as the absence of pub-
lic legitimacy, the institutional deficiency 
of the Secretariat, the non-committal and 
non-compliant behavior of member states, 
the ostensible skepticism toward regional 
integration arising from the prolonged cri-
sis of the European Union, and the realpoli-
tik of entrenched vested interests in varying 
domestic political economies.6
Yet, understanding the AEC project 
appears to be more important now than 
making prognoses about the 2015 target. 
The year 2015 is only symbolic, at best, of 
a much deeper ideology being used by par-
ticular sections of the elite class and social 
forces to advance their specific worldviews 
for the preservation and promotion of their 
material interests. To complement existing 
debates, it is thus a worthwhile analytical 
endeavor to examine the ideas and inter-
ests behind the AEC. In doing so, the task is 
to address the problematique: What does 
the AEC project mean for socio-economic 
development and democratization, par-
ticularly for the general well-being of the 
peoples and environments from society to 
society in the region of Southeast Asia?
In this paper, I attempt to unpack the 
AEC Blueprint to reveal the project’s neo-
liberal capitalist strategy of «accumulation 
by dispossession,» whereby the drive for 
the acquisition of more wealth and power 
by the economically wealthy and politically 
powerful necessitates the deprivation of the 
peoples’ collective rights and access to the 
economic, political, social, and ecological 
commons.7 I therefore offer a critical reading 
of the AEC project in the analysis, specifically 
its agenda for the establishment of a compet-
itive single market, and conclude with some 
important pointers on forging an alterna-
tive regionalism process for Southeast Asia’s 
development and democratization.
The AEC competitive single 
market: Accumulation by 
dispossession
The AEC project is an institutional blueprint 
based on the ideology of neoliberalism, 
which is designed to guide the continuation 
of the process of neoliberalization in South-
east Asia. True to its neoliberal character, 
the AEC fundamentally embodies capitalist 
social relations and values that put priority 
on the private over the public, on profits 
over peoples, and on markets over the com-
mons in the organization and governance 
of the economy, the polity, the society, the 
ecology, and the whole of humanity. This is 
evident in the crafting of the «inter-related 
and mutually reinforcing» characteristics 
of the AEC vision for an economic regional 
bloc: a single market and production base, 
highly competitive, equitable, and fully 
integrated into the global economy.8
The centerpiece of the AEC is the pro-
ject to build a competitive single market 
whose core elements are the free(r) flow 
of goods, services, investments, capital, 
and labor. Immediately after the adoption 
of the AEC Blueprint and the Charter, a 
series of trade and investment agreements 
by ASEAN have been signed and adopted 
within Southeast Asia itself and with Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, South Korea, India, 
Japan, and China. These are institutional-
ized commitments to the management of 
the neoliberal order through the further-
ance of free trade, competitiveness, and 
an open market economy. ASEAN’s unwa-
vering embrace of neoliberal capitalism is 
telling of its envisioned development par-
adigm for the present and future shape of 
the region’s economies. In fact, it is in the 
contexts of the region’s obvious vulnerabil-
ity to ecological, climate-related disasters 
and neoliberalism’s three successive major 
economic crises in the last decade – the 
1997 Asia crisis, the 2001 dot-com bubble 
collapse, and the 2008 Atlantic crisis – that 
a daring project for a competitive ASEAN 
Since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has 
been working toward a vision of a  
political, economic, and social alliance.  
But how realistic is achieving that  
ambitious goal, given the tremendous  
heterogeneity of the region? ASEAN  
unites countries at vastly differing levels  
of development. Author Bonn Juego  
takes a closer look at the ASEAN Vision  
2020 platform, as well as the ongoing  
debate about it in the individual member  
states. He examines the potential  
of this ASEAN program, which is aimed 
at equal participation in society and 
the equitable distribution of economic 
resources, and concludes with  
some thoughts on how those rights  
could be ensured.
On December 15, 1997, the heads of states 
and governments comprising the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
agreed on the region’s vision for the year 2020 
to realize fully a «Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality,» a «Partnership in Dynamic 
Development,» and a «Community of Car-
ing Societies.»1 This «ASEAN Vision 2020» 
thus provided the general framework for the 
subsequent Bali Concord II in 2003, which 
defined the three pillars that the «ASEAN 
Community» is built upon: a political-secu-
rity community, an economic community, 
and a socio-cultural community.2 With an 
air of confidence during the 12th summit 
in 2007, the state leaders signed the Cebu 
Declaration to accelerate the integration 
process – thus hastening the group’s desired 
realization of the ASEAN Community by 
2015.3 The ASEAN Charter entered into force 
on December 15, 2008, as the institutional 
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Although the ASEAN Community vision 
respects and keeps diversity in the politi-
cal-security and socio-cultural pillars, its 
agenda for the economic sphere is one of 
unity. This means that the master plan for 
the modernization of Southeast Asia’s accu-
mulation structure – through the formation 
of competing states and competitive econo-
mies within the single market – entails the 
fact that capitalism can be accommodated 
to or embedded in: (a) different political 
regimes (from authoritarianism in Singa-
pore and elite democracy in the Philip-
pines to monarchy in Brunei and military 
rule in Myanmar); (b) disparate economic 
structures and levels of development (from 
Malaysia’s exported-oriented industrializa-
tion and Thailand’s newly industrializing 
economy to Vietnamese-style central plan-
ning and Laotian pastoralism); and (c) vary-
ing cultural orientations (from Indonesian 
Islam to Cambodian Buddhism). This also 
means that proponents of neoliberaliza-
tion have strategies to align the neoliberal-
ism ideology with the interests of local elites. 
Likewise, these established local elites have 
ways to capture or utilize said ideology in 
pursuit of their interests in the expansion of 
their personal stakes as the AEC amplifies 
the circuit of capital accumulation within 
and outside the national state while main-
taining its class power and social status. In 
the neoliberal policies of privatization and 
liberalization, for instance, established 
domestic elites with access to, or control of, 
government resources might have the first-
mover advantages in business or the needed 
political connections to secure contracts in 
the transfer of state assets to private compa-
nies and to get illicit support mechanisms – 
through activities such as rent-seeking and 
corruption – in opening up a particular eco-
nomic sector.11 It is because of this adapt-
ability of capitalism to a variegated set of 
social regimes and the consistently elitist 
and elite-led nature of neoliberalism that the 
ideas and interests of the AEC neoliberaliza-
tion project have to be critically examined.
Free flow of goods
The AEC enjoins member states to continue 
with the efforts of the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area toward the goal of zero tariffs and the 
removal of non-tariff barriers to free trade 
of goods. Consistent with the ideas of the 
World Trade Organization – whose aims at 
regulating international economic relations 
imply the limiting of development policy 
options, especially of developing countries – 
the AEC rules on the free flow of goods have 
adverse implications for the prospects of 
economic development and sustainable 
development in the countries of the region.
Firstly, the thorough elimination of 
tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers effec-
tively denies Southeast Asia’s developing 
economies the important economic tools 
to create infant industries and strengthen 
their domestic productive structures while 
providing for social welfare. The history of 
economic development – from England 
and Continental Europe to the United 
States and East Asia – shows the crucial role 
played by the strategic use of tariffs in the 
industrial policies of these now-developed 
countries during the catching-up phase of 
their economic progress (e.g., increasing 
export duties on raw materials and increas-
ing import duties on foreign manufactured 
goods as carrot-and-stick economic poli-
cies to encourage the development of local 
technological capabilities and domestic 
manufacturing industries).12
Secondly, the mad rush for growth 
through the overproduction of goods for 
profits and trade perpetuates the culture 
of consumerism, which has negative envi-
ronmental consequences. Moreover, the 
outward orientation of production of goods 
for exports does not encourage the devel-
opmental goal of self-sufficiency, such as 
the importance of food security. This is, for 
instance, tantamount to making the large 
agricultural sectors of the region’s devel-
oping countries grow crops for export that 
their peoples cannot afford to use or eat.
Free flow of services
The AEC desires to completely liberalize 
trade in services where «there will be sub-
stantially no restriction to ASEAN services 
suppliers in providing services and in estab-
lishing companies across national borders 
within the region, subject to domestic regu-
lations.»13 This is obviously in line with the 
contentious agenda of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services – together with 
those of other international agreements on 
investment measures (TRIMS) and intel-
lectual property rights (TRIPS) – that have 
been negotiated since 2000 under the Uru-
guay Round of the World Trade Organiza-
tion. The AEC packages encompass a wide 
range of services to be liberalized such as 
telecommunications, maritime transport, 
construction, waste management, tourism, 
education, healthcare, and water supply. 
With liberalization as its central thrust, the 
AEC provides greater «market access» to 
domestic economies – that is, in the context 
of Southeast Asia’s developing countries, 
foreign (ASEAN) companies doing business 
of providing services in domestic econo-
mies – and, in effect, prohibits governments 
from regulating the behavior and business 
conduct of multinational and transnational 
corporations.
There are legitimate grounds to ques-
tion the rationale of the AEC’s scheme to 
liberalize trade in services from the per-
spective of development and democratiza-
tion. A couple of interrelated issues reveal 
the scheme’s contradictions. Firstly, in rela-
tion to the argument above on the impor-
tance of building domestic manufacturing 
industries for development, under the AEC 
agreement on trade in services, the devel-
oping countries in the region are being 
deprived of the strategy of infant industry 
protection that successful developers from 
Europe to America to East Asia have utilized 
in the past. Budding local service indus-
tries are expected not to withstand fierce 
competition from well-established firms 
from technologically advanced developed 
countries. It would be ideal for the long-
term and vibrant economic development 
of Southeast Asian countries if the demand 
for private services were to come from the 
needs of the manufacturing and agricul-
tural industries, and that the wealth created 
from these sectors form the tax base for the 
government’s resources for the responsible 
public provisions of social services.
Secondly, the agreement does not make 
a clear distinction between private and pub-
lic services, and as such between economic 
and social policies. It therefore enlarges the 
scope of market access beyond the purely 
economic to encroach on the fundamen-
tal principle of a social compact between a 
government and its citizen-taxpayers in the 
provision of public services. This particular 
privatization of social services means the 
private appropriation of the assets of oth-
ers, whereby private property rights are pro-
tected while stripping off peoples’ access to 
their originally held – and supposedly inal-
ienable – social rights and entitlements.
single market by 2015, patterned after the 
rules-based European Union, has been 
launched and is being pursued.
By authoring their accession to the AEC, 
states have effectively locked themselves 
in the disciplines of neoliberalism and its 
attendant principles and policies of pri-
vatization, liberalization, commodification, 
and other market-oriented governance 
reforms. Through a top-down approach, 
state leaders have committed their respec-
tive governments, economies, communi-
ties, peoples, and resources to economic 
activities that are led by and centered on 
the interests of the private sector – inter-
ests that are not necessarily reflective of, 
or leading to, the welfare of the commons. 
Underpinning this process of forming a 
region-wide economic bloc is the strategy 
of «convergence club,» which focuses on 
policy reforms and institutional restructur-
ing at the level of national states in line with 
the logic of – and in preparation for – global 
competitiveness.9 The domestic economies 
of these states will have to simultaneously 
cooperate and compete with each other so 
as to secure the conditions for free trade, cir-
culation of money, and production systems 
conducive to the survival and expansion of 
the region’s capitalist market.
At a regional level, a key challenge for 
the convergence club model is to resolve an 
emergent two-tier bloc between the relatively 
more globally integrated ASEAN-6 (Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand) and the latecomers (Cambo-
dia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). ASEAN 
recognizes this «development divide,» and 
hence the AEC is considered both the means – 
through its Initiative for ASEAN Integration – 
and the ends for accelerating and realizing 
the regional integration process.10 However, 
an even greater challenge to the creation of 
the single regional market appears to be the 
specificities of domestic socio-economic for-
mations, characterized by a diverse nature of 
capitalist regimes, or the so-called varieties 
of capitalism, with historically entrenched 
political-economic elite class interests from 
country to country.
The centerpiece of the AEC is the project to build  
a competitive single market whose core  
elements are the free(r) flow of goods, services, 
investments, capital, and labor.
14 15Development Debates in Asia The ASEAN Economic Community Project The ASEAN Economic Community Project Development Debates in Asia
of private accumulation of investors does 
not carry their share of social responsibility 
and public accountability. Thus, the modus 
operandi is to privatize the accumulation 
drive of investors while socializing the risk 
and cost of market operations.
Freer flow of capital
The AEC’s agenda for «capital market» 
integration refers to financial capital, par-
ticularly on furthering the liberalization of 
capital and current accounts and the whole 
question of money, finance, or exchange. In 
recognition of the fact that the region’s gen-
eral capital market is already free, the AEC 
wants to make the flow of capital «freer» 
than what Southeast Asian economies have 
become, despite the financial restructur-
ing and banking reforms done before and 
immediately after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. Still, it is important to be reminded 
of the effects of financial liberalization in 
Asia, particularly during the early 1990s, 
which contributed a great deal to criti-
cal factors that caused the 1997 crisis. As a 
result of market reforms through financial 
liberalization, the growth strategy of making 
Southeast Asian economies FDI-attractive 
encountered the consequences, whether 
intended or unintended, of «irrational exu-
berance» of investors, the rapid inflow of 
short-term capital, portfolio-based invest-
ments in the stock market, and the domi-
nation of finance (money) over productive 
(real economy) capital.
The AEC plan is to guarantee freer capi-
tal mobility by streamlining rules, regula-
tions, and controls that are perceived to 
constrain the growth and accumulation 
activities of the private sector. States are 
thus urged to ensure the easy «entry» and 
«exit» of capital in domestic markets. Rather 
than encouraging longer-term investments 
and enlarge the tax base for economic and 
social development, the AEC will be replete 
with short-termist investors, making the 
region vulnerable to capital flight – and 
hence financial and economic crises. More-
over, resolving, if not preventing, recurrent 
financial crises would be all the more dif-
ficult without the government resorting to 
monetary policies such as exchange-rate 
and capital controls to arrest capital flight. 
The lesson of the 1997 Asian crisis is that the 
neoliberal restructuring processes, both in 
the real economy and finance, in the region 
had made the region’s economies export-
driven and foreign dependent – which 
undeniably resulted in a massive inflow of 
FDIs but eventually proved to be vulnerable 
to unhealthy speculation and capital flight, 
as shown in the crisis experiences of Thai-
land, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philip-
pines. Indeed, the 1997 crisis has revealed 
the problems of liberalized financial sys-
tems and the financialization of the econ-
omy, as well as the structural weaknesses 
of the real economies of Southeast Asia’s 
export-oriented productive sectors.
Free flow of skilled labor
Labor-market flexibility is central to ASE-
AN’s neoliberalization strategy of securing 
the hegemony of capital over labor. South-
east Asian open regionalism envisages the 
free mobility of capital in the form of goods, 
investments, and money, but it does not 
really promote the «free» movement of 
labor. Within a neoliberalizing economy, 
the region will be a market with a huge 
reserve army of «flexible,» unorganized, and 
insecure workers who are adaptable to the 
accumulation interests and requirements 
of capital – often through race-to-the-bot-
tom competitiveness strategies such as the 
lowering of labor costs and environmental 
standards – and who are subjected to poor 
working conditions and the hiring / firing 
prerogatives of those who pay them wages.
Even though the AEC Blueprint specifi-
cally identifies «skilled labor» to be prior-
itized in migration policy, the agreement 
has implications for the general condi-
tions of the labor and employment struc-
ture. In particular, the AEC is silent about 
addressing current challenges and realities 
in Southeast Asia’s economic relations at 
the national and regional levels. Firstly, it 
ignores the character of transnational labor 
as a consequence of uneven development in 
the region where labor follows capital – that 
is, workers migrate from poorer to better-off 
countries. This migration process involves 
not only documented but also undocu-
mented migrants, as well as skilled and 
unskilled workers. Secondly, it does not take 
into account the palpable predominance of 
the informal sector in the region’s economic 
activities. The regional integration project is 
wanting in plans to bring informal labor to 
formal employment, let alone the aspiration 
to crafting development strategies for full 
employment. And thirdly, its emphasis on 
managed mobility of skilled labor does not 
mean a truly free socio-cultural and polit-
ical-economic community where a South-
east Asian human being can settle, work, 
and live in any place or country where s / he 
decides to lead a good life.
Toward an alternative  
regionalism of the commons
The ASEAN Economic Community project 
intends to institutionalize and get legiti-
macy for the ideology of neoliberalism and 
the process of neoliberalization toward a 
single market. It seeks to protect and pro-
mote the material and ideological interests 
of the private sector, private property, and 
private profits at the expense of the public 
weal and social values of the commons. Its 
neoliberal capitalist form is substantially 
elitist in character that – while it attempts 
to «modernize» the varieties of capitalism 
in Southeast Asia, it does so by encouraging 
«new» (transnational) capitalist and elite 
classes to replace, compete, or ally with 
the «old» (national) ruling elites. The AEC 
project is, however, contradictory. On the 
one hand, it drives convergence by repro-
ducing the institutions, policies, and rela-
tions associated with neoliberal capitalism 
from society to society within the economic 
bloc. It does so, however, by also repro-
ducing divergent tendencies, resulting in 
socio-economic, political, and ecological 
antagonisms, inequalities, hierarchies, and 
injustices.
No doubt that the AEC project is already 
embroiled in conflicts with the realpolitik 
of a variety of capitalisms in Southeast Asia – 
especially from sections of entrenched class 
interests – resisting or usurping the com-
petitiveness agenda in their local accumu-
lation regimes. But it is still very important 
to challenge the neoliberal project in the 
arenas of politics, policy, and discourse in 
the same way that the old and enduring elit-
ism in the region’s social relations is being 
opposed. The analysis in this paper has 
highlighted the contradictions in the AEC 
project – thus, pointing the way to which 
alternative politics, strategies, vision, and 
movements can be forged and advanced at 
Free flow of investments
The AEC Blueprint section on the free flow 
of investments has evolved into the 2009 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agree-
ment, which is a revision and consolida-
tion of earlier protocols and two major 
investment agreements, namely, the 1987 
ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement 
(an agreement for the promotion and pro-
tection of investments) and the 1998 Frame-
work Agreement on the ASEAN Investment 
Area.14 The main objective of the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement is to 
make Southeast Asia an attractive regional 
market, especially for foreign direct invest-
ments (FDIs), by creating an economic 
system where businesses are competitive, 
profitable, mobile, and secure through the 
protection, facilitation, promotion, and 
liberalization of the overall investment 
regime. State resources and social institu-
tions are oriented toward the creation and 
maintenance of this system, which is more 
responsive and favorable to capital than the 
commons, and to market forces than popu-
lar-democratic forces.
A high degree of certainty, predictabil-
ity, and security are to be accorded to capi-
tal through state-guaranteed institutions. 
Key to this agenda are the AEC’s straight-
forward provisions on the protection of 
investors’ properties, interests, and activi-
ties, specifically:
 investor-state dispute mechanism;
 transfer and repatriation of capital, 
profits, dividends, etc.;
 transparent coverage on the expro-
priation and compensation;
 full protection and security; and
 treatment of compensation for losses 
resulting from strife.15
What do these injunctions mean? First, the 
provision on investor-state dispute reso-
lution signifies the encroachment of the 
global / regional strategy of capital on the 
national sovereignty of states. It thus gives 
greater legal rights to foreign investors than 
to domestic businesses; at the same time, 
corporations are vested with the right to sue 
governments. Second, states (in this con-
text, the peoples of Southeast Asia) shall be 
the absorbers of business risks and also of 
market failures. In effect, the private sector 
is virtually exonerated from losses, bank-
ruptcy, or social conflicts. Third, the pursuit 
The AEC project is already embroiled in conflicts  
with the realpolitik of a variety of capitalisms in 
Southeast Asia.
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Second, there is a need for socio-political 
movements that take the points of view of 
people power, labor, the natural environ-
ment, and human life itself and regard the 
«social commons» as an appropriate, timely, 
strategic, and progressive ideal for the socio-
economy, ecology, and humanity shared by 
peoples in the region. The concept of the 
social commons here is: critical of neoliberal 
«social protection» remedy, which connotes 
safety nets for the inevitable dispossessions 
that necessarily come with the process of 
capital accumulation; essentially protective 
of peoples’ collective socio-economic rights; 
and transformative of existing unjust social 
and international relations.
Third, a counter-hegemonic process 
of «democratization» as a political-eco-
nomic and socio-ecological ideal has to be 
urgently set in motion. Democracy, in this 
sense, means people power at all levels of 
organizing human relations – from states 
to workplaces to communities to the natu-
ral environment. In this democratization 
process, it shall be democracy – rather than 
market forces and elite classes – that is the 
driving mechanism of the polity, economy, 
society, and ecology. Relations in the demo-
cratic alternative regionalism project for 
Southeast Asia will therefore be based not 
on the logic of competition but on the values 
of solidarity, equality, and social justice. 
the level of states, and coordinated at the 
regional and international levels, based on 
the ideology of the commons and the inter-
est of the common good.
An alternative to the AEC neoliberaliza-
tion project will have to take the perspective 
of the commons in the context of contem-
porary Southeast Asia, which has been his-
torically ridden with underdevelopment, 
poverty, privation, conflicts, and injustices. 
I sketch out here a few important themes for 
this alternative vision and movement.
First, it is crucial to develop a particular 
«mode of production» for wealth creation 
that is economically productive, socially 
acceptable, and ecologically sustainable – 
it shall be the foundation of the goals of 
redistribution toward a life of dignity. This 
requires a development strategy that under-
stands a suitable economic development 
policy for developing countries – where a 
technologically green manufacturing sector 
is in synergy with the agricultural, service, 
and small-and-medium enterprise sectors; 
and where progress leads to higher wages 
for workers, higher earnings for enterprises, 
and a larger tax base for the government’s 
social welfare provisions. At the moment, 
there is an urgent need to alter economic 
policy objectives from growth obsession 
(i.e., through investments driving GDP) to 
the goal of full employment, which is good 
for the economy and can be beneficial for 
the environment.
There is a need for socio-political movements  
that take the points of view of people power, labor, 
the natural environment, and human life itself.
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Unprecedented Economic Growth
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low per capita income, performed relatively 
well on social indicators, including a high 
average life expectancy, high literacy rates, 
and low child mortality.
The freedom of movement was ex- 
tremely limited due to the rigid enforce-
ment of the household registration system 
and by the absence of free labor and hous-
ing markets in the cities. Career paths were 
determined by authorities, rather than 
by individuals. Access to information was 
curtailed by the instrumentalization of the 
media as a propaganda tool.
Thirty-five years later, China has dra-
matically transformed itself. Not only has 
it significantly reduced poverty (down to 
120 million people, or less than 10 percent 
of the population, after the official poverty 
line was raised to $1.25 / day in 2011), it 
has also built up its entire infrastructure, 
moved 260 million rural migrant workers 
into cities, qualified its workforce, attracted 
investment and high-tech industry, and 
eventually turned itself into the manufac-
turing hub of the world. In this process, 
China had accumulated a record $3.6 tril-
lion in foreign reserves by 2013. In addition, 
China’s companies are increasingly invest-
ing in economies all over the world. In 2012, 
China’s foreign direct investment outflows 
reached $62.4 billion – roughly one-fifth 
of US foreign direct investment – and it is 
growing at an annual rate of 15–20 percent.
Within a little more than three decades, 
one of the world’s most isolated and uni-
form nations has transformed itself into a 
highly diverse society and established itself 
as the key engine in an increasingly inter-
connected world. Today, China has 1.2 bil-
lion registered mobile phones, 600 million 
internet users, and more than 300 million 
micro bloggers. For the first time, the digital 
media provides a space where debates on 
a broad variety of topics can take place. In 
2012 about 400,000 Chinese students stud-
ied abroad, gathering first-hand experi-
ences from many different parts of the world. 
Due to the withdrawal of the state from the 
private sphere, lifestyles and professional 
development choices for the young genera-
tion have become increasingly diverse. Even 
without fundamental political reforms, this 
probably constitutes the fastest transforma-
tion in human history on such a scale – and 
many developing countries (and increas-
ingly developed countries, too) look with 
envy at China’s impressive economic per-
formance and growth rates.
But despite all these achievements, 
China has had to pay a high price for its 
development, most obviously in social and 
environmental terms. The gap between 
the rich and poor has grown larger than 
ever before in the history of the People’s 
Republic, so much so that, according to 
the International Monetary Fund, China’s 
inequality has already overtaken that of 
Brazil and India. Hundreds of millions of 
migrant workers and their families have 
become the social «collateral damage» 
of China’s economic miracle. Uprooted 
from their rural hometowns and with their 
families torn apart, they have turned into 
today’s urban cheap labor force; without a 
local household registration, they do not 
qualify for social security and lack access 
to affordable urban housing and educa-
tion for their children. Although they have 
contributed greatly to China’s economic 
success and modernization, they often 
describe themselves as second-class citi-
zens. Well-known university professor and 
outspoken public intellectual Qin Hui (see 
next article) has described their fate as the 
«Southafricanization» of China, comparing 
it to the treatment of blacks and Coloureds 
as a disposable work force in South African 
cities during the apartheid era.
Due to inflation and rapidly rising liv-
ing costs, particularly in the urban centers, 
which provide most of the employment 
opportunities, real incomes have not 
increased for many ordinary Chinese. Free 
healthcare, education, and pensions, which 
were provided through the work units until 
the 1980s, were gradually abolished and 
replaced by a mix of market mechanisms 
and a still incomplete social welfare system, 
organized by the state. Particularly the com-
mercialization of healthcare and education 
in the 1990s has generated additional finan-
cial burdens for low-income families. The 
primary reason for households falling under 
the poverty line today are soaring medical 
costs. Despite economic growth, social 
mobility today is lower than at the begin-
ning of the reforms back in the 1980s. One 
key reason is the education system, which 
provides many more opportunities for chil-
dren of wealthy families and is increasingly 
difficult for the children of low-income par-
ents to access.
China’s environmental record over the 
past three decades has been equally prob-
lematic. This is partly manifested within 
China’s boundaries in the form of dete-
riorating air, soil, water, and food quality. 
Hardly a week goes by without reports of 
new food scares, record levels of micro-
particles in the air, cancer villages,1 and 
the like. Hardly any Chinese citizen is unaf-
fected by these issues. Rural populations are 
even more affected by a wide range of issues, 
including soil depletion, water shortages, 
and pollution, as well as the excessive use 
of fertilizers and pesticides, etc. But apart 
from the situation on the national level, 
there is a more complex impact of China’s 
economic growth on the global ecology. The 
shift of production from Western industrial-
ized nations to China has also been a shift 
toward an economy with significantly lower 
energy efficiency and higher environmen-
tal externalities. Despite improvements 
over the past years in this regards, this trend 
is currently reinforcing itself through the 
«going-out strategy»2 of China’s economy. 
As a result, China’s ecological footprint has 
increased massively beyond its national 
boundaries. Today, it uses a significant pro-
portion of all global resources (although, 
admittedly, much of what China produces 
is consumed elsewhere), and it has become 
the biggest emitter of CO2 in the world, with 
per capita emissions almost reaching the 
levels of European economies.
In addition to the environmental and 
social costs, there is also a growing aware-
ness that decades of rapid economic 
growth – and the emerging materialist val-
ues that it has brought with it – are threat-
ening the rich and diverse cultural heritage 
of China. The symbols of fast food and con-
sumerism are all too visible in every Chi-
nese city (there even has been a Starbucks 
in the Forbidden City and a KFC in Beijing’s 
famous Beihai Park). Monetary values 
have become the key indicators in judging 
individual success in life. But also the non-
The global economic downturn, growing 
social inequality and a looming  
climate crisis have brought the concept of 
planetary boundaries to the center  
of the debate on sustainable development 
once again. This has led to loud critiques 
of development approaches that are 
based on the pursuit of GDP, particularly 
in Western societies. Thanks to  
economic reforms, China has experienced 
35 years of rapid economic growth and 
benefited tremendously from the  
opportunities provided by globalization. 
What are the benefits and the costs of 
this transformation? And how do  
independent Chinese thinkers view global 
development, environmental sustainability, 
social justice and the role of politics?  
The following two articles attempt to 
provide some answers.
When China embarked on its economic 
reform process in 1978, a large part of its 
population lived in poverty. Even according 
to China’s own rather low poverty thresh-
old (which until 2011 was about $0.60 / day), 
31 percent of its people were living below it; 
if one had applied the $1 / day standard – or 
even the current $1.25 / day standard – the 
poverty count would have reached 54 per-
cent and 85 percent, respectively. At the end 
of the 1970s, more than 80 percent of Chi-
nese were living in rural areas, there were no 
highways in the entire country, and per cap-
ita energy consumption was only a tenth of 
what Romanians – then among the poorest 
nations in Europe – used at that time. But 
to leave it here would sketch an incomplete 
picture. China in those days was one of the 
few examples of a country that, despite very 
20 21East Asia China: 35 Years of Reform and Opening Up China: 35 Years of Reform and Opening Up East Asia
2025, China is planning to move another 
250 million rural residents into newly con-
structed towns, and thereby hopes to turn 
them from largely self-reliant peasants into 
urban consumers. While the social and eco-
nomic costs of this plan may be enormous, 
it follows the established logic of China’s 
modernization narrative, in which eco-
nomic growth remains the foundation of 
development. It is seen as the only way to 
further increase material living standards, 
which in turn are regarded as a prerequisite 
for social – and thereby political – stability. 
But although this recipe may have worked 
in the past 35 years, it is questionable 
whether it will be sufficient for the future. 
In light of the social and ecological chal-
lenges, it is unlikely that more of the same 
(growth-driven approach to development) 
with a bit of green economy will suffice to 
ensure a socially just and ecologically sus-
tainable future. Given the high concentra-
tion of power in the one-party state and 
the intransparent merger between politi-
cal and economic elites, the question is 
if – and who within – China will be able to 
change course. Many independent intel-
lectuals in China argue that there will be 
no sustainability without political reforms. 
But this debate is rather sensitive. Political 
reforms do not seem to be on the agenda 
of the new government, and questioning 
the achievements of the Communist Party 
has just been declared a no-go area in the 
notorious Document No. 9,4 circulated ear-
lier in 2013. Indeed, in a meritocracy such 
as China, economic success has been the 
major source of legitimacy for the Commu-
nist Party. In the early days of the reforms, 
there was broad consensus on the need to 
raise the material living standards in China 
and to reduce poverty. But today, the ques-
tion of what kind of development – for what 
purpose and for whose benefit – is best 
cannot be answered that easily.
Despite these burning questions and a 
lot of official rhetoric around sustainable 
development, there is surprisingly little 
public debate within China questioning 
the role of economic growth in develop-
ment. The first reason for this is that while 
the benefits of the reform era are claimed 
by the state to enhance its legitimacy, its 
critique has been largely instrumentalized 
by China’s political left to discredit Western 
capitalist influences. In this way, the report 
The Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome 
was introduced in China in the early 1980s 
as a critique of the new policies of reform 
and opening up, not as a reminder of the 
need to rethink growth or make it more sus-
tainable. Secondly, many of China’s leading 
economists today studied in the United 
States during the 1990s and have been 
highly influenced by neoliberal economic 
theories. Their critiques focus primarily on 
the dominant role of the state and state-
owned enterprises in China’s economy and 
are less concerned with issues regarding 
sustainability. Thirdly, the environmental 
movement in China is still rather weak and 
has limited influence on the debate con-
cerning sustainable development. Most of 
the arguments from environmentalists are 
limited to issues concerning the destruc-
tion of nature through human activity, and 
they fail to generate a more holistic reflec-
tion on sustainable development that links 
social justice and economic development 
with environmental sustainability. Finally, 
the reform and opening-up era not only 
started China’s rapid economic develop-
ment, it is also seen by many to have sig-
naled the end of the political excesses of 
the Cultural Revolution. And despite all the 
valid criticisms of China’s growth-driven 
development approach, who wants to go 
back to those days? 
urban indigenous cultures of China’s many 
ethnic minorities are disappearing at a fast 
rate. Under the current Five-Year Plan, all 
nomads of China will have to settle down 
and thereby end centuries of a traditional 
non-sedentary lifestyle. The end of their 
traditional livelihoods will also substan-
tially alter some of the most unique cul-
tures on this globe.
The social and environmental chal-
lenges are not new to the government. 
Since the 1990s, sustainability has become 
one of the key topics of Chinese politics. 
Recent leadership figures had made «har-
monious society» and «scientific develop-
ment»3 the major slogans during their time 
in office. But within the last 10 years, the 
environmental crisis has arguably wors-
ened and China’s income gap has grown 
larger than ever before. This makes the 
success of similar announcements by the 
new leadership, which has coined a slogan 
of building an «eco-civilization,» doubtful 
in the eyes of many critics. Although mas-
sive investments have been announced to 
clean up the air in Beijing, develop low-
carbon energy (mostly hydropower and 
nuclear energy), and build «sustainable 
cities,» the development strategy of the 
new government is still based on generat-
ing more growth, which will continue to 
depend largely on the exploitation of Chi-
na’s brown energy reserves.
With demand declining in the wake 
of the global economic crisis, the new 
strategy for sustained growth in China 
is to encourage domestic consumption. 
One key pillar of this strategy is a massive 
urbanization plan, which was announced 
by the new government late in 2012. The 
target is ambitious, to say the least: By 
1 Since the 1990s there have been many reports in  
and outside of China about so-called cancer  
villages; these are characterized by above-average 
incidence rates of different forms of cancer,  
allegedly related to air, water, and soil pollution from 
carcinogenic chemicals. In 2013, a study that  
was led by the Chinese Centre for Disease Control 
and Prevention and based on water surveillance  
data and cancer rates along the Huai River has 
confirmed the link between pollution and increased 
cancer rates in these regions. In one case, the lung 
cancer rate among women had increased twentyfold 
in the period between 1973 and 2005.
2 The going-out strategy was first articulated by the  
Chinese government in 1999 to encourage its  
enterprises to invest abroad. This strategy aims at  
the internationalization of China’s economy, but it is 
also partly a result of the huge foreign reserves  
that China has accumulated.
3 The «scientific development concept» was put 
forward in 2005 by the previous leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party. It aimed to correct the 
overemphasis on GDP growth and instead  
promoted a «people-centered» development approach, 
which focuses more on the development of social  
welfare and the reduction of social inequalities, as 
well as addressing excessive environmental pollution.
4 The so-called Document No. 9 refers to a partly 
leaked memo that was circulated to Chinese leaders 
in April 2013. It defines the ideological no-go  
areas in China and is mostly directed against using 
Western concepts such as constitutional democracy, 
civic participation, human rights, press freedom,  
etc., to undermine the authority of the party and the 
state in China.
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Debating Global Sustainable Development 
from a Chinese Perspective
Qin Hui
The relationship between 
sustainability and political 
structures
Some people think that the pursuit of GDP 
growth after reforming and opening up 
caused the ecological and environmental 
disruptions that China is facing today. Of 
course, this is one important reason, but it 
is not that simple. China already had severe 
environmental problems long before the 
economic reforms began in the late 1970s. 
The Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) caused 
unprecedented ecological disasters, includ-
ing massive deforestation for steel-making 
and flooding caused by hydropower plants. 
But the most severe problem at that time 
was the great famine,2 so nobody was talk-
ing about environmental problems. During 
the Cultural Revolution, increasing GDP 
was not the state’s objective at all; environ-
mental problems, just as with other social 
problems at that time, were not caused by 
the pursuit of economic growth, but rather 
by the pursuit of political power.
Environmental protection is not merely 
a question of awareness, but also of political 
structures. Without an effective institutional 
arrangement, the emphasis on environ-
mental protection would be hollow. Since 
the beginning of the reform and opening-
up era, we have put economics in command 
instead of politics. Since the 1990s, GDP has 
become the primary objective of China’s 
development; it was subsequently also used 
as the key criteria for assessing the perfor-
mance of government officials. Due to the 
worsening environmental situation, many 
people have been calling for changing the 
objectives of development and adjusting 
indicators for evaluating political perfor-
mance. Some people have even designed 
new indicators, such as «green GDP.» But 
from my perspective, the question of who 
has the right to pursue and to evaluate is 
even more important than the question of 
what to pursue. In a system of unrestrained 
power and lack of accountability, anything 
the state pursues carries the risk of deviat-
ing from people’s expectations.
Green public interventions 
or green market transac-
tion? China’s dilemma
There are basically two ways to deal with 
environmental challenges: The first is 
through public interventions, while the 
second is through market mechanisms. The 
former is based on regulations and restric-
tions from the government and through 
interventions by civil society. This could be 
called «ecological socialism.» The second 
approach is based on pricing of so-called 
externalities and on the assumption that 
markets work better than administrative 
interventions; this could be called «ecologi-
cal capitalism.» An example of such a mar-
ket-based approach is carbon trading. I have 
noticed the debate over the two approaches 
in the Western world, but I believe both 
practices could be used together to achieve 
a greater impact and that they do not neces-
sarily contradict each other.
But in China neither of the approaches 
can function: Due to the highly concen-
trated power of the government, we do 
not have a free market. At the same time, 
we also do not have a welfare state, as the 
responsibilities of the government are too 
limited, due to the lack of bargaining power 
of the people. In such a context, we are lack-
ing the conditions for both effective pub-
lic intervention as well as effective market 
mechanisms. Frankly speaking, I worry that 
in this situation, carbon trading will only 
be used as an excuse to shift responsibili-
ties away from the government to the mar-
ket, whereas carbon control would further 
increase the power of the state. Both carbon 
trading and carbon control will encounter 
problems at the national levels, where dem-
ocratic governance does not exist. Before 
initiating the debate on market mecha-
nisms versus government intervention in 
China, the first thing is to reform the gov-
ernment and ensure fair play in the market.
The participatory democracy approach 
of the Green Party implies that constitution-
alism alone is still not enough to protect the 
people, and that citizens should also partici-
pate in social governance through channels 
such as NGOs. But in China, it is not even 
allowed to talk about constitutional democ-
racy, and NGOs can hardly survive under 
the strong pressures from the authorities. 
Recently, even the term «civil society» has 
become too sensitive politically to be men-
tioned. Under such circumstances, what 
would «participatory democracy» be like? 
«Public opinion» under such a system could 
only be the views offered by obedient sub-
jects. Therefore, a participatory democracy 
in China can only be meaningful when it is 
based on constitutional governance.
Establishing China’s own  
reflection on «green»  
development
China’s environmental movement emerged 
during the reform era in the 1980s under 
the influence of Western green ideas. Trans-
lations of the report The Limit to Growth 
by the Club of Rome and of the book Silent 
Spring1 were very important for China’s 
«green enlightenment.» Therefore, China’s 
understanding of the need for environmen-
tal protection is universal in terms of basic 
values, but the problem is that the ideas are 
highly Westernized. People tend to think 
that China’s environmental problems fol-
low the same patterns of Western countries. 
This is the «curse» of the environmental 
discourse introduced to China by the West. 
Whereas those advocating Western green 
ideas present distinct traits of self-reflection, 
some Chinese reflect more on the West than 
on China. Many people in China still think 
that environmental problems are caused by 
Western countries and are a result of capi-
talism, modernity, and especially indus-
trialization. China’s New Left particularly 
likes this idea. In my opinion, this argu-
ment might hold in the West, but we cannot 
simply repeat it in China. Personally, I am 
in favor of environmental protection, but I 
think that although ideas can be imported, 
questions need to be defined by the local 
context, and our thinking has to be inde-
pendent. Green thoughts in China need to 
have their own focus.
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spending – and are at the same time under 
pressure from the political Right to lower 
taxes – increased state borrowing has been 
the only way out. The context of globaliza-
tion makes an international loan mecha-
nism possible. Whereas Western countries 
like to borrow money, China particularly 
loves to lend money. The fact that China has 
the richest government of the entire world 
is a result of a huge surplus of productivity. 
This surplus is, in turn, generated by a lack 
of bargaining power of the population and 
by an ideological constellation in which the 
Chinese political Left calls for enhanced tax 
collection, while the political Right helps 
the government to shirk its responsibility 
in redistributing its wealth. This leads to 
insufficient domestic consumption and the 
need to transfer financial surpluses to other 
countries in the form of loans.
The current globalization brings about 
many challenges, but we can neither address 
them through trade protectionism, nor can 
we further enlarge the deficits to maintain 
the welfare system. What we can do, though, 
is to further the process of globalization to 
promote other important aspects, such as 
global democratization, ensuring human 
rights, and establishing global govern-
ance mechanisms. In this sense, I hope 
that Europe can play a leading role. The 
EU, although not a global system, is still the 
most successful cross-border mechanism. 
Global governance requires global democ-
racy. To realize it, all countries involved 
should be democracies at a national level, 
just as in the EU. In China, therefore, green 
ideas must be democratic ideas first. Eco-
nomic globalization without global democ-
ratization is clearly not enough. But without 
China’s democratization, global democratic 
structures will remain a distant dream. 
The global impact of  
China’s development
Environmental protection and pollution 
prevention are different from ordinary 
national governance, fundamentally for 
the reason that pollution tends to extend 
beyond national boundaries. Both pollu-
tion regulation and carbon trading face the 
challenge of a lack of global governance 
mechanisms. An obvious example is Ameri-
ca’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. Specific 
interests overwhelm abstract values, espe-
cially without effective mechanisms for 
enforcement.
But it is not only the global environment 
that is affected by development; instances 
of social injustice are also increasing, in 
both Europe and China. The economic 
integration among countries with differ-
ent political structures and human rights 
standards is an important reason for this 
situation. When capital flows into coun-
tries with low human-rights standards, it 
will create the sweatshops we see in China. 
Simultaneously, workers’ wages in devel-
oped countries will come under pressure 
due to a loss of employment opportuni-
ties at that end. Although globalization 
also drives economic growth in developed 
countries, it also increases income inequal-
ity. On the other end, powerful players in 
countries with low human-rights standards 
associate with international capital, and 
increase their wealth, often far beyond the 
levels of the wealthy in the West. This trend 
is causing severe social tensions on both 
sides. In the West, it leads to a deepening of 
the debt trap. As political parties are keen 
to meet the needs of the public in a demo-
cratic country in terms of social welfare 
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Since 2008 South Korea has been active-
ly promoting its vision of «green growth.» 
Kim Hyunji explores this new Korean 
development paradigm and examines the 
activities of the Global Green Growth  
Institute (GGGI), the Korean govern- 
mental think-tank-turned-international-
institution that globally advocates  
for green growth. Since GGGI is a rela-
tively new institution, this article only 
serves as an introduction to the topic. The 
Heinrich Böll Foundation will continue to 
watch and analyze the activities of GGGI 
as its green growth paradigm spreads to 
the developing world.
Introduction
Green growth played a prominent role in 
the five-year term (2008–2013) of former 
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. 
While other developed and emerging coun-
tries were desperately trying to find a way 
out of the fiscal downturn, he was offering 
the vision of «low carbon, green growth» 
for Korea as the centerpiece of his political 
agenda. By advocating green growth inside 
and outside of the country, the Lee adminis-
tration tried to make Korea the hub of a new 
green development movement.
In December 2009 the Korean Assembly 
passed the Basic Act on Low Carbon Green 
Growth, which had been submitted by the 
Lee administration and has been in force 
since April 13, 2010. It has dealt chiefly with 
the creation of a nationwide inventory for 
greenhouse gas emissions, established a 
National Energy Plan, and installed a Com-
mittee on Green Growth under the direct 
authority of the president. Meanwhile, three 
agencies – GGGI (Global Green Growth 
Institute), GCF (Green Climate Fund), and 
GTC (Green Technology Center) – were set 
up in Seoul under an umbrella of a «green 
triangle» to respond to strategy, finance, 
and technology issues, respectively.1
Since February 2013, when President 
Park Guen-hye took office, the governmen-
tal agenda has shifted from green growth 
toward the creation of a «creative economy» 
as a driver for future growth. The presi-
dential Committee on Green Growth was 
downscaled and relegated to the directive 
of the prime minister. However, the most 
prominent institution on green growth, 
GGGI, had already expanded to the inter-
national arena.
The Global Green  
Growth Institute
GGGI was created by former President Lee 
as a think tank for green growth in order to 
spread the idea of green growth to the world 
as a new paradigm of development. It started 
as a non-profit organization under Korean 
law in June 2010, but went through a pro-
cess of internationalization in late summer 
2012 in conjunction with the Rio+20 confer-
ence. With Norway having ratified GGGI’s 
Establishment Agreement on August 26, 
2013, there are now 13 of the 20 member 
countries that have ratified the agreement.2 
Also, since June 2013, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has granted GGGI official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) eligibility status. 
This enables the institute to receive large 
donations from multilateral organizations 
and governments and enhances the ability 
1 Silent Spring by Rachel Carson, published in 1962,  
is widely seen as being the initial spark for the global 
environmental movement.
2 The great famine lasted for three years, from 1958 
to 1961, and probably led to more than 30 million 
deaths; it was mostly a result of the agricultural  
policies during the Great Leap Forward, but it was 
also aggravated by drought.
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Green growth is about to be experimented 
with in places where growth is desired but 
where the environment should be protected 
as well. However, with regard to the rela-
tionship between the environment and the 
economy, the common belief in the 1970s 
was that the relationship was a negative one. 
The report The Limits of Growth, published 
by the Club of Rome in 1972, insisted that 
economic growth itself would be limited in 
part due to the consequences of the massive 
destruction of the environment caused by 
unsustainable industrialization. According 
to this ground-breaking report, developed 
countries should discontinue policies for 
economic development and developing 
countries should give up the strategy of 
industrialization.
In the 1980s the Ecological Moderniza-
tion Theory (EMT) in Germany offered a 
different perspective. Proponents of EMT 
insisted that economic growth does not 
always cause environmental degradation, 
and that eco-innovation in the industrial 
sector could bring economic growth in the 
long term. The key factor of EMT is that with 
the given resources and ecosystem, both 
eco-efficiency and economic efficiency can 
be improved at the same time.
According to an article by Lee Yeonho, a 
professor for political science at Yonsei Uni-
versity, green growth is based on the Kuznets 
Environmental Curve Hypothesis.4 The 
Environmental Kuznets Curve is a hypoth-
esized relationship between environmental 
degradation and income per capita.5 In the 
early stages of economic growth, degrada-
tion increases, but beyond some level of 
income per capita, the trend reverses and 
economic growth leads to environmental 
improvement. As incomes grow, economic 
growth becomes the most powerful means 
to protect the environment, and improved 
technologies help to advance environmen-
tally friendly economic growth. In this «ideal 
relationship» between green and economic 
growth, the importance of sustainable 
development – paired with environmental 
protection – is never overlooked.
It is this optimistic expectation of 
green growth – that it can equally push 
economic growth and environmental 
conservation – that is the driver behind 
this new green development paradigm of 
GGGI. However, compared to the concept 
of sustainable development, it is hard to 
find any social context in the green growth 
paradigm. Most worryingly, in terms of the 
environment, green growth – as propa-
gated by GGGI – does not seem to be aware 
of existing planetary boundaries and the 
current environmental crisis.
GGGI’s activities in a  
recipient country
Sharing knowledge about green growth 
with – and building capacity in – develop-
ing countries is GGGI’s main activity. In 
particular, GGGI is helping in establishing 
Green Growth Plans (GGPs) for its members 
and other developing countries. GGPs are a 
good example of GGGI’s preference for a 
whole-of-government approach for a para-
digm shift toward green growth.6
The first step of a GGP is to assess a 
country’s own strategy for achieving eco-
nomic development.7 After that, GGGI 
helps to identify where potential economic 
benefits can overlap with environmental 
benefits, hence it diagnoses the compat-
ibility of a country’s development priorities 
vis-à-vis its green growth potential. It also 
helps in evaluating political options and 
assists with investment analyses in order 
to attract public and private donors. In fact, 
the creation of public-private financial 
cooperations is one of the cornerstones of 
green growth planning.
However, achieving real success with a 
GGP seems to be difficult. Due to the way 
GGPs are created, there is no way to check 
their validity and effectiveness. Even though 
they are drafted by recipient countries, it 
does not mean they respond to local needs 
or fit the social-economic context.
Korean experience of failed 
green growth
Korea, now an active promoter of green 
growth, had based much of its spectacular 
economic success on «brown growth» in 
the past. Having been one of the poorest 
countries in Asia in the 1960s, Korea now is 
a driver of regional economic development 
and an active member of the G20. Subse-
quently, Korea has changed its position from 
being a recipient country of ODA to being a 
donor country.8 In 2009 it became the 24th 
member of the OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee, which is a leading multi-
lateral body that allocates ODA in the world.
Over the past five decades, however, 
the Korean government has put a major 
emphasis on rapid economic growth only. 
Economic developmental plans focused 
on target industries while offering govern-
mental support. First under dictatorship 
and later under a democratic government, 
Korea not only emphasized rapid growth 
but also massively increased its export-
dependent economic structure. Environ-
mental considerations played only a minor 
role, if any. But the environment of Korea 
became severely polluted, and an environ-
mental movement grew in response to dis-
eases caused by this pollution. Although 
the government has attempted to manage 
the environment, conflicts between the 
development industry and environmental 
advocates are still taking place, even at the 
policymaking levels. Conflicts surround-
ing the Four Major Rivers Project or the 
expansion of nuclear power plants – pro-
moted as a clean form of energy – are good 
examples of this.
The Four Major Rivers Project is the 
most representative green growth project of 
the Lee administration. Spending 22 trillion 
Won (more than $20 billion), the adminis-
tration tried to build 16 dams on the Han, 
Nakdong, Guem, and Yeongsan rivers. The 
government claimed the project is needed 
in order to prevent floods and droughts 
and that it will improve both the economy 
and the environment. Opponents, includ-
ing civil society groups, insisted that the 
Four Major Rivers Project is unnecessary 
for the environment, and they cast doubt 
about claims of flood prevention, since it is 
not the major rivers, but rather the smaller 
streams, where regular floods occur. They 
go on to say that the whole campaign was 
nothing more than a large infrastructure 
project and that the beneficiaries would be 
only the handful of companies involved in 
the construction of the dams and in land 
speculation in waterside areas surrounding 
the construction sites.
Despite the criticisms, the Lee admin-
istration pushed forward with the project, 
promoting it internationally as an impor-
tant part of its green growth vision. The 
project was announced in December 2008, 
its master plan was set in June 2009, con-
tractors were selected in September 2009, 
and construction was almost finished 
within three years. However, the Board of 
Audit and Inspection of Korea said in its 
second project audit in January 2013 that 
reservoirs had many design flaws and that 
a severe degradation in water quality was 
a serious concern.
to intervene in a growing number of devel-
oping and emerging countries. Following 
its one-year anniversary as an international 
organization in October 2013, and now with 
offices in Copenhagen, London, and Abu 
Dhabi, GGGI is now a truly globally operat-
ing organization.
Germany is not yet a member country of 
GGGI but is listed with the Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear safety (BMU) as a project-spe-
cific donor and partner.
GGGI is composed of an Assembly, a 
Council, an Advisory Committee, and a Sec-
retariat, but the Council has much weight in 
decision-making. As the supreme organ, the 
Assembly is comprised of member states 
that meet every two years. The Assem-
bly elects member states to the Council, 
appoints the director-general, and receives 
reports from the Secretariat. The Council 
is GGGI’s executive organ, consisting of no 
more than 17 members, among which are 
contributing and participating members, 
non-state actors, the host country, as well 
as the director-general, who has no voting 
rights. The Council nominates the director-
general to the Assembly, appoints experts or 
non-state actors, approves Advisory Com-
mittee membership, and is responsible for 
directing the institute’s activities as well as 
for approving the annual budget. The Advi-
sory Committee is a consultative and advi-
sory organ consisting of relevant experts 
and non-state actors. Finally, the Secretariat 
is GGGI’s operational organ, headed by the 
director-general, who reports back to the 
Assembly and the Council.
Environmental protection 
or just another way to  
promote economic growth?
Richard Samans, former director-general of 
GGGI, stated that GGGI views itself more as 
an economic institution and not as an envi-
ronmental institution.3 It means that GGGI 
puts more weight on achieving economic 
growth by enhancing resource efficiency 
than on meaningful environmental policies.
The important question here is: Can 
economic growth go hand in hand with envi-
ronmental conservation? Facing this age-
old question, supporters of green growth 
often answer that economic growth and 
environmental protection do not necessar-
ily need to be seen as conflicting concepts. 
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November 2012 that its budget transpar-
ency and efficiency fell far below what is 
required. It was pointed out that operat-
ing expenses were carelessly enforced and 
that money was recklessly spent by private 
contracts and poorly managed. At that time, 
GGGI said that they recognized the problem, 
but that it had happened in a trial-and-error 
period during a process of internationaliza-
tion, and that they would promote open 
competition for the contracts thereafter.10
Conclusion
GGGI has since become international and 
is no longer the responsibility of Korea. 
However, something can be learned from 
the unsuccessful experiences with green 
growth as well as the risks posed by top-
down approaches in Korea, so as not to 
repeat the same mistakes internationally. 
The term «bottom-up,» as used by GGGI, 
does not include the concerns of local peo-
ple, but refers only to the voluntary decision 
of a country to collaborate with GGGI. The 
institute can reach out to local governments, 
but what if there is a lack of communication 
and consultation between local govern-
ments and the citizens of a given country? 
With the Advisory Committee, GGGI fea-
tures a forum composed of non-state actors 
to advise and comment on its initiatives. 
However, it seems to be a place for experts 
and consultants rather than civil society 
and local voices.
The possibilities offered by green growth 
might be good news for developing coun-
tries, where there are both developmental 
needs and environmental risks. It is good 
that GGGI will share its green knowledge 
and technology with developing countries, 
as it will help to build the capacities of their 
public sectors. However, it would be far bet-
ter if GGGI also considers sustainable devel-
opment rather than just promoting green 
growth or focusing only on the economy 
and growth. If it really wants to create a new 
developmental paradigm, GGGI should pro-
foundly reflect on the blind spots that green 
growth does not address. Green growth all 
too often only aggressively adopts market 
principles that directly contradict sustain-
able development.11 Financing a given pro-
ject is important for its implementation, 
but market solutions are not always the 
right answer to environmental challenges. 
If GGGI really wants to be a serious advo-
cate of green and inclusive development, 
it should take into account the social and 
environmental contexts first before apply-
ing market principles. Pro-market logic 
will correlate with the obvious shortcom-
ings of green growth, as shown above, and 
therefore undermine the credibility of green 
growth as a serious development alternative. 
However, if GGGI becomes more flexible in 
finding ways to engage local civil society, it 
could drastically reduce the risk of unneces-
sary failures.
In order to do so, strategists, planners, 
and executives of GGGI should ask some of 
the following questions: What if economic 
growth can cause environmental degrada-
tion? What if a market solution does not 
achieve the desired outcomes? Is it enough 
to create separate national Green Growth 
Plans in order to bring sustainable develop-
ment to the world? How can the validity of 
a given project effectively be checked and 
transparently communicated? Do we listen 
enough to the local voices?
Korea successfully set the agenda of 
green growth on an international level. 
Green growth is now stepping onto the 
international stage, where it needs to 
prove its validity as a meaningful develop-
ment paradigm. It is not yet clear whether 
GGGI can deliver on its aim to combine 
green growth and sustainable development, 
nor whether green growth is an answer to 
global environmental challenges. As a first 
step toward convincing its Korean and 
international critics, it would therefore be a 
good idea to rethink the approach of green 
growth by focusing more on the environ-
ment and less on the economics. 
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Domestic criticism of GGGI
The Four Major Rivers Project by former 
President Lee is an example showing the 
risks of a top-down approach to green 
growth. After the government changed in 
early 2013, when the project was near com-
pletion, the validity of the project was still 
being questioned due to the occurrence 
of adverse effects, such as the large-scale 
death of fish, unusual algal blooms, and a 
bridge collapse due to retrogressive ero-
sion. Why did the project have to be pushed 
forward, even though it could not meaning-
fully prevent floods or accelerate economic 
growth and only degraded water quality and 
destroyed nature? President Lee pressed for 
a fast execution of the project without con-
sulting local communities and civil society 
groups. This indeed reflects one of the major 
concerns of GGGI’s strategy. For the success 
of any development project, it is now inter-
national credo to consider how well projects 
meet local needs and how the concerns of 
local civil society can be addressed. This 
would not only ensure the support of – and 
ownership by – local communities, it would 
also prevent the waste of natural and finan-
cial resources while giving credibility to the 
validity of a given project prior to its execu-
tion. Some other international initiatives 
of GGGI should be carefully scrutinized 
and reconsidered in this respect as well: for 
example, a REDD+ project in Kalimantan in 
Indonesia and a Mekong River project.9
As a result of the serious shortcom-
ings of the Four Major Rivers Project and 
other green growth initiatives of the Korean 
government, domestic criticism of green 
growth in Korea – and especially for its un-
environmental policies in the name of green 
growth – has grown in the last years. Indeed, 
opponents of green growth have pointed out 
that it is solely a «greenwashing,» and that it 
is even causing severe environmental dam-
age. Civil society groups in Korea wanted to 
draw a line between green growth and the 
«green economy» when it was referred to in 
Rio+20 in 2012, since they thought that green 
growth had moved too far from the context of 
sustainable development, which is intended 
to respect the balance between the environ-
ment, society, and the economy. However, 
GGGI should not export the green growth 
path that Korea took … and failed with.
In addition, further criticism of GGGI’s 
finances emerged when the Board of Audit 
and Inspection of Korea warned GGGI in 
1 Korea won the bid to host the GCF Secretariat in 
October 2012 and opened GTC in March 2012.
2 Countries that have signed the Establishment  
Agreement: Cambodia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Guyana, 
Kiribati, Norway, Papua New Guinea, The Philip-
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United Kingdom, Vietnam; process of ratification 
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Paraguay, Mongolia, Rwanda.
3 Jill Kosch O’Donnell, The Global Green Growth  
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4 Yeon-Ho Lee, Developing Countries in APac and 
Green Growth, Korean Journal of International 
Studies 51(4) (2011): 41.
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International Society for Ecological Economics, 
2003, 1; available at: http: / / isecoeco.org / pdf / 
stern.pdf.
6 GGGI, Annual Report 2012, 12. As of 2012, projects 
and programs in the following countries were  
ongoing: Brazil, Cambodia, China (Yunnan), Ethiopia,  
India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Peru, Mongolia, 
Morocco, The Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand, United 
Arab Emirates, Vietnam, among others.
7 O’Donnell, The Global Green Growth Institute, 4.
8 Korea had been a recipient country from its establish-
ment in 1948 to the early 1990s. It ended its position 
as a recipient country of official development  
assistance from the World Bank in 1996.
9 The 2012 annual report of GGGI stated that its 
program includes both projects, but they are still 
controversial at the local level.
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south korea 
china The city of Shenzhen in south China is 
primarily known for its spectacularly success-
ful economic achievements. In just over three 
decades, it has grown from being an  
insignificant village on the border with Hong  
Kong into one of the country’s richest 
cities, home to 10 million people. Most of 
Shenzhen’s population are newcomers  
who have moved to the city from other parts 
of China. But now there is also a group of  
young people, who were born in the city at 
the start of the economic upturn, whose 
entire outlook on life is shaped by their 
experiences of hyper-growth – people known 
as the «80s generation».
Top: Xiao Lang, 25, dances at a karaoke 
club near his college. The son of a successful 
Shenzhen-based businessman, he expresses 
little concern about how life may turn  
out after he graduates. With dyed hair and 
tattoos, his friends say he behaves more like 
a gangster than a college student.
Middle: Zhen Peng, 25, wears his favorite 
luxury sunglasses on the way to a friend’s 
wedding in Shenzhen. A physical education 
student in college, after graduating  
he launched a furniture company. Having 
found the business not to his liking, he gave  
it up and now teaches physical education  
at an elementary school.
Bottom: Li Guanhao, 23, kisses his girlfriend 
during a graduation trip. A year later, the 
couple split up after the salary at Li’s first 
job proved not enough to keep their  
engagement going. Wei Ran, behind Li, 
joined an investment bank after graduating 
and is now preparing to marry his fiancée, the 
daughter of a successful local businessman.
© Chen Jianhua
© Ben Weller
South Korea is a mountainous country with a scarcity of flat land for 
agriculture. Even in large cities such as Busan, people carve out  
small farms and gardens along terraced hillsides, often next to their 
homes and apartments. Produce from these plots feeds families  
and is also sold in traditional street markets. The growth of mega super- 
markets, as well as the unrelenting pace of urban development, 
threatens these farmers, their land and their markets. Few farmers are 
young – 40 percent are over 60 years old – and most have seen their 
children and grandchildren move to other professions.
Left: A farmer harvests produce from her small hillside plot in Sasang, 
a working class neighborhood of Busan. More than half of South 
Korea’s farmers are women.
Above: A farmer pauses while spreading manure on his plot, also  
in Sasang. South Korean farms are small, averaging just 1.4 hectares,  
or 3.5 acres.
china
Yang Yunbiao, 
Farmer, Founder and 
Director of the 
Tangxing Peasant 
Association, 
Anhui Province
«The current development is all about material development, not  
about ethical development. People’s values are measured in material 
terms. The newly modelled villages and towns are also modeled  
according to material criteria. It is no problem for us as a peasant asso-
ciation to make money, but if we want to get involved in community-
building, the local government will not allow us to do so. I am  
always joking that when we want to organize a worker and farmer  
song contest, it’s not allowed by the local government. But if we would 
organize a strip-tease show, it would be allowed, as long as it is for  
making money.
If 30 years ago people were not allowed to engage in economic activities, 
we would not have today’s material prosperity. Similarly, for the  
next 20 years society must be allowed to engage in social construction.»
«China’s law is slowly improving, and 
China’s experiences with development 
are increasing. The trend for the  
future is very good. The new premier,  
Xi Jinping, put forward the slogan 
of the ‹China Dream.› Previously the 
United States also had the ‹American 
Dream,› and that dream propelled 
America’s rapid development. Under 
the leadership of Xi Jinping, China will 
also experience rapid development. But 
in contrast to the United States, the 
‹China Dream› will be more affected by 
structural and legal limitations.
The remaining challenge is to improve 
China’s legal system, and that the  
government will give more support for 
public welfare and charity.»
Gao Zengyun, Director of 
Development Department, 
Beijing Huiling Community 
Services for People with 
Learning Disabilities
«For ordinary citizens, sustainable devel-
opment is an important issue. Our  
current way of exploiting resources can 
best be described by (the Chinese proverb 
of) ‹draining the pond to get all the  
fish›. For example the mines which are 
being dug all over the place and of which 
many are collapsing, will lead to the 
exhaustion of our natural resources. Bal-
anced development should preserve the 
environment while developing the econ-
omy, but the sustainability of our ecology 
is threatened by pollution; and there  
is the problem of food safety and there are 
health problems due to the lack of super-
vision. In the end, these are structural 
problems.»
Bai Shengyi, 
Director of 
Gansu Xingbang 
Social Work 
Service Centre
pakistan
«I am very worried about my country.  
We are troubled by terrorism and 
sectarian violence. Religious minori-
ties especially have almost no oppor-
tunities and have to fear for their lives. 
Many want to emigrate. If things  
continue this way, in 10 years there  
may be no Christians or Hindus left in 
Pakistan. But the same is also true  
of experts and people with skills. Any-
one who has the chance goes abroad. 
How can things ever get better under 
those conditions?»
Kulsoom Monica, 
Program Coordinator, 
Islamabad
«The government of Nawaz Sharif plans  
to concentrate on stimulating the economy. 
The biggest challenges in that are the  
energy crisis, urbanization without plan-
ning, the dangerous security situation in 
many parts of the country, and the lack of  
religious and ethnic tolerance. But I think 
we can solve the problems if we make  
a greater investment in education. Pakistan 
has an abundance of young and energetic 
people.»
Abdul Sattar 
Research 
Consultant at 
the Sustainable 
Development 
Institute, 
Islamabad
«Our fate as a nation is highly dependent on how the situation in Afghanistan 
develops. Will there be civil war there? Will the Taliban resurgence grow stronger? 
All of that influences our domestic policy. I have been an activist for a long time, 
and I consider myself a patriot. I campaign for women’s and human rights and  
I’m determined to continue that work. Civil society needs to be better coordinated  
and put greater pressure on the government. Thankfully, as single women in Paki-
stan get older, it becomes easier for them to openly criticize the status quo.»
Saima Jasam, 
Development and 
Gender Expert, 
Islamabad
Britta Petersen has been the 
director of the Pakistan  
office of the Heinrich Böll 
Foundation since 2010. Before 
assuming that post, she was  
the South Asia correspondent for 
the Financial Times Deutschland 
in New Delhi. As founder of the 
non-profit organization  
«Free Press Initiative,» in Kabul, 
Afghanistan, she won the 2005 
Leipzig Prize for the Freedom 
and Future of the Media, and 
in 2009, the Gisela Bonn Prize 
awarded by the Indian Council for  
Cultural Relations in honor of 
her contributions to fostering 
German-Indian friendship.
Toward an «Islamic Welfare State»
Alternatives to the Western Economic Model
Britta Petersen
when one ‹socialist› states that he never 
heard of Umar’s law. I will ask Mr. Khan the 
context and origin of his claim.»
Khan did achieve at least one thing with 
his verbal thrust – bringing the eternally 
simmering debate in Pakistan about the 
concept of an equitable economic system 
to the top of the agenda. This is a burn-
ing issue in a country where, according to 
the UN Human Development Index, some 
60 percent of the population must survive 
on less than $2 per day, and which was just 
recently saved from a severe financial crisis 
with a bailout of $6.7 billion from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF).
The belief that Islam could provide solu-
tions is gaining more and more support in 
conservative Pakistan. Socialist and com-
munist parties have lost virtually all ground 
since the 1990s, and this year the domi-
nance of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 
came quietly to an end as it sank under the 
weight of profligate corruption. The PPP 
has always positioned itself as the party of 
the poor, yet in the last five years, it has gen-
erated few real ideas for economic reform, 
apart from the Benazir Bhutto Income Sup-
port Program, which provides cash pay-
ments to some families earning less than 
about $70 per month.
Nor is it just Islamic parties such as the 
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam bloc or the Jamaat-
e-Islami, who include the establishment of 
an «Islamic welfare state» in their platforms. 
Even business-friendly politicians such as 
Shabaz Sharif, chief minister of Punjab and 
brother of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, reg-
ularly mention the issue in their speeches. 
And Pakistan’s chief of army staff, Ashfaq 
Kayani, speaking at independence day cel-
ebrations, said «We should always remem-
ber that Pakistan was not created only as a 
geographical entity. Rather, Pakistan was to 
become an ideal Islamic welfare state that 
would showcase how Islam’s golden prin-
ciples can form the basis for a modern and 
tolerant society.»
Islamic economic principles
That all sounds very noble. But what really 
distinguishes an Islamic welfare state from 
other models, and what precisely is an 
Islamic economic concept? Experts agree 
that Islamic economic principles do exist. 
Some differ from the prevailing capitalist 
model, such as the ban on charging inter-
est (riba); others are not at variance with it, 
such as the Muslim obligation to give alms 
(zakat). The source for these tenets is found 
in both the Qur’an and the Hadiths (records 
of the sayings or deeds of the prophet 
Muhammad), and parts of the societal 
model draw on early Islam, the era of the 
four «Rightly-Guided Caliphs» (632–661 AD).
In addition to the concept of a welfare 
state, which goes back to the Qur’anic tenet 
of success or well-being (falah), there is 
a well-developed Islamic finance sector 
around the world, which provides believ-
ers with financial products that adhere to 
religious strictures and sharia. Falah is 
often interpreted as a comprehensive aim 
for the spiritual, moral and socio-economic 
well-being of citizens. «The financial system 
and the idea of a welfare state exist side-by-
side, but they are not the same,» says Habib 
Ur Rehman, director of research for Imran 
Khan’s PTI.
It is not only in Pakistan that opinions 
are divided on whether an economic model 
based on Islamic principles would work, 
whether it would be a viable alternative 
to the current capitalist system, and how 
true to Islam an economic system could 
or should be. Akbar Zaidi, former profes-
sor of political economy at Karachi Univer-
sity, is of the opinion that there really «is no 
Islamic economic model,» but rather only a 
collection of relatively vague ideas from the 
pre-modern era. But Ejaz Akram, a political 
science professor at Pakistan’s elite Lahore 
University of Management Studies, says 
«On the basis of ideals, Islam is definitely 
capable of offering an alternative paradigm 
to capitalism.»
Akram, who is also a member of a 
Sufi order, stresses that Islamic principles 
were developed at a time when the mod-
ern form of economic growth did not exist 
and a subsistence existence was the rule. 
He says, «From the spiritual perspective 
of Islam, poverty is not a lack of prosper-
ity, but rather a surfeit of desires.» He adds 
that the Islamic approach is not to create 
a social welfare state in the Western mold, 
but rather to ensure that everyone has the 
necessities of life.
The Islamic scholar and television lec-
turer Javed Ahmad Ghamidi buttresses that 
argument by saying, «The goal of Islamic 
economies is to establish social and eco-
nomic justice. That also implies that Mus-
lims are better able to concentrate on Allah 
if the necessities of life are taken care of.»
Although the reference to God sounds 
radical and monastic to Western ears, the 
approach is, at its core, in full concord with 
common criticisms of the capitalist growth 
model. As Ejaz Akram says, «For ecological 
reasons, it is neither possible nor desirable 
to introduce American or European con-
There has been much debate in Pakistan 
over the last few years about establishing 
an «Islamic welfare state.» In a country 
that is politically gridlocked by trench 
warfare and corruption – and in which  
a great proportion of the population lives 
below the poverty line – conventional 
economic models are increasingly unable 
to provide adequate solutions to  
pressing problems. However, the questions 
are: What precisely constitutes Islamic 
economic principles, and how does  
an Islamic welfare state differ from other 
models? This article by Britta Petersen 
attempts to address those questions.
Is an Islamic welfare  
state overdue?
Imran Kahn, a politician and a former 
Pakistani cricket star, is always good for 
making a bold statement. In the Pakistani 
general elections this year, his party, Paki-
stan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), fell short of the 
hoped-for majority. Shortly thereafter, the 
newly-minted opposition leader said, «The 
founding of Pakistan would be meaningless if 
it does not become an Islamic welfare state.» 
Kahn then went on to astound the public at a 
press conference in Islamabad by saying that 
the Scandinavian welfare states are actually 
modeled on ideas propounded by Caliph 
Omar (584–644 AD) and that it was time to 
«bring our culture back to our own land.»
Many Pakistani intellectuals ridiculed 
Khan for these claims, and even the general 
secretary of his own party, Arif Alvi, felt the 
need to backpedal when questioned, saying 
«I am not a scholar and I can understand 
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person’s bank account at the beginning of 
Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting. The 
money collected this way is given to local 
intermediaries elected in Muslim commu-
nities, who distribute it to the needy.
But the system’s capacity to create the 
kind of justice called for in the Qur’an seems 
limited. Although the money distributed to 
those in need is often their only salvation, 
the flow of donations remains haphazard, 
and many of the needy fall through the 
cracks. «Many people distrust the govern-
ment, so they withdraw the money from 
their accounts before Ramadan to keep 
it out of the hands of the state,» says Maz-
her Zaheer, financial coordinator for the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation in Islamabad. He 
himself admits that he would rather donate 
money to institutions with which he is famil-
iar, saying «There have been many cases of 
corruption and political abuse of zakat.»
That system cannot guarantee every 
citizen even the fundamentals of existence, 
never mind the universal health care and 
education that the PTI platform calls for. On 
top of that, Pakistan has one of the lowest 
tax quotas in the world (only 9 percent of all 
citizens pay taxes), so it would seem there 
is little chance of the country instituting a 
welfare state in the foreseeable future. The 
government of Nawaz Sharif, acting under 
pressure from the IMF, has just committed 
to comprehensive reform of the tax system, 
aimed at raising the tax quota to 15 percent.
Economic growth via  
Islamic banking?
With population growth running at about 
2 percent per year, Pakistan will have to 
depend on economic growth in the future 
if it hopes to raise large segments of the 
population out of poverty.
That is where men such as Humayon 
Dar come into play. The economist is one 
of the leading masterminds behind the idea 
of Islamic banking. Dar lives in London, a 
financial center where he is strategically well-
placed. He develops financial products that 
comply with sharia law and also preaches 
the value of the Islamic financial system as 
being an important source of foreign invest-
ment in Pakistan – particularly from other 
Muslim countries, believing it could provide 
solutions for the global financial crisis.
«In the current financial system, the pro-
ducers of goods and services receive only 
10 percent of the yield, whereas 90 percent 
goes to bankers and financers,» says Dar. He 
goes on to point out that the Islamic finan-
cial system, by contrast, is aimed at broad-
ening prosperity, reducing poverty, and at 
the equitable distribution of income. He 
points out that «Islamic law not only pro-
hibits interest, but also trading in debt, and 
speculation. So it is capable of eliminating 
the massive inequity that characterizes the 
current economic system.»
Given the fact that Islamic banking so far 
accounts for only 2 percent of the global 
financial markets, realizing that proposi-
tion seems unlikely. Dar’s suggestions for 
Pakistan’s economy, by contrast, sound like 
a neo-liberal austerity program: cut back 
subsidies, reduce national debt, and trans-
fer social services such as education, health, 
and the like to private charitable trusts 
(auqaf ), while making sure that the reform 
measures demanded by the IMF are in com-
pliance with sharia.
The debate over whether an Islamic 
economy means public welfare from cradle 
to grave, self-restraint, and slashing con-
sumption, or whether it should be a liberal-
style minimalist state is bound to continue 
unabated for some time, and not just in 
Pakistan. In the final analysis, it seems that 
Akbar Zaidi, the political economist from 
Karachi, may indeed be right when he says 
that there is no Islamic economic system. 
But the Qur’an can certainly provide food 
for thought for economists and politicians. 
sumer standards worldwide.» Islam, he 
says, teaches an economy of self-restraint, 
in which the state is obligated to take care 
of the material survival of its citizens, as well 
as their spiritual well-being.
But that aspect has seldom been 
brought to the fore in the public debate. 
When they hear the term «welfare state,» 
Pakistani voters – much like Imran Khan – 
tend to think more of the Swedish model 
than the ascetic theories propagated by 
the Sufis. There is very little discussion of 
abstinence and alternatives to economic 
growth. Instead, there is a boom in cam-
paign promises.
«According to the Constitution of 
Median [the basis of the first Islamic state], 
the state is your mother, who looks after you 
from birth to death,» says Habib Ur Reh-
man from the PTI. He enumerates that in 
an Islamic system, the right of all citizens 
to food, medical care, education, security, 
and freedom must be guaranteed. He says 
he sees no contradiction in that to the glob-
ally dominant economic system. From that 
point of view, an Islamic economy seems 
to be something along the lines of social 
democracy plus sharia. «Our goal is for 
Pakistan’s economy to be as Islamic as pos-
sible while still remaining part of the inter-
national system,» says Habib Ur Rehman.
The idea of charity already plays an 
important role in Muslim societies. In 
Pakistan, the faithful are expected to give 
2.5 percent of their wealth to the poor. That 
wealth is calculated as any money that is 
not used in any given year. Individuals can 
provide proof that they have donated that 
amount through private channels. If they do 
not, the state gives them a helping hand by 
collecting the contribution directly from the 
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The Big Indian Development Debate
Growth and / vs. Inclusion
Axel Harneit-Sievers
tional role and as a member of the BRICS 
group of leading emerging economies. 
Many believed that India appeared to be on 
China’s heels, on a development path that 
was perhaps a bit slower than China’s, and 
certainly more chaotic, but nonetheless on 
the right path. With India’s democratic polit-
ical system and its more widespread use of 
the English language, it was even consid-
ered as having some strategic advantages 
over China.
India’s development  
model in crisis?
Today, however, with general elections 
expected for April or May 2014, the entire 
Indian development path suddenly appears 
to be in crisis. There is an acute economic 
downturn: The GDP growth rate has fallen 
below 5 percent, the Indian rupee has lost 
18 percent of its value against major foreign 
currencies since early 2013, and growth 
figures for manufacturing and foreign 
investment have been declining. There is 
a widespread perception of political stag-
nation: The United Progressive Alliance 
government, led by the Congress Party, is 
tainted by large-scale corruption scandals. 
It appears to have lost the capacity to drive 
reforms. And there is the more fundamen-
tal questioning of the direction of the Indian 
development and growth path. Has India’s 
economic growth been «inclusive»? Has it 
brought people out of poverty? And what 
type of development has growth – defined 
primarily as GDP growth – brought about?
The current economic downturn is 
likely to remain a temporary phase: Positive 
fundamentals of the Indian economy – such 
as its huge market size and the country’s 
youthful demographic structure – remain 
valid, and a new government in power from 
mid-2014 is likely to have greater capacity 
to make strong economic policy decisions. 
Thus, it is very probable that the economy 
will recover from its current slump, though 
it remains open whether it will return to the 
high GDP growth rates of earlier years.
«Growth matters» vs.  
«uncertain glory»
However, the question about the Indian 
development and growth path is far more 
difficult to answer, and it is being debated 
extensively in India today. India is a country 
with a strong debating culture, and the array 
of print and electronic media offer much 
commentary on this topic every day. Four 
of India’s leading economists recently pub-
lished two books that are widely acknowl-
edged to represent the two predominant 
positions in the ongoing debate about 
development, growth, and inequality in 
India.
Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Pana-
gariya take a liberal (some may call it «neo-
liberal») stance in their book Why Growth 
Matters. They maintain that economic 
growth – measured by GDP – constitutes 
the foundation for any meaningful devel-
opment and the reduction of poverty. Only 
on the basis of fast growth, they say, do 
redistributive reforms geared toward pov-
erty alleviation and the building of human 
capital become viable.
Bhagwati and Panagariya argue that 
India’s economic growth since the 1990s 
has indeed substantially reduced poverty: 
The proportion of the poor population, 
according to Planning Commission figures, 
fell from 44.5 (1983) to 27.5 (2004 / 2005) 
percent. Taking population growth during 
this period into account, they estimate that 
187.5 million people left the status of pov-
erty (at least in its most extreme form) in 
the same period.1 Bhagwati and Panagariya 
then identify persistent impediments to 
India’s continued growth: inflexible labor 
legislation operating against rapidly grow-
ing companies; the difficulties of land 
acquisition for public and private industries 
and housing; the poor state of public infra-
structure, most dramatically so in the field 
of power supply.
Although Bhagwati and Panagariya also 
argue for innovation and reform in the social 
sector, for example by favoring competition 
and privatization in the educational services, 
redistributive reforms are clearly lower on 
their list of reform priorities. Within India’s 
current political spectrum, their position is 
broadly identified with (or seen to support) 
the Bharatiya Janata Party and its prime 
ministerial candidate for 2014, Narendra 
Modi. As the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi 
has overseen a rapid rise of industrial and 
export-oriented development in a state that 
many acknowledge to be well-governed and 
with low levels of corruption.
For more than a decade, fast-growing 
India appeared to be well on the path  
to becoming another superpower. However, 
a considerable part of India’s population 
has remained poor and India’s growth 
lacks social inclusion. The debate is not 
new, but it is gaining increased attention 
in the current economic downturn,  
with elections pending for spring 2014.
Once upon a time, many Indians, and many 
people in the rest of the world, believed that 
India was well on its way to becoming one of 
the next superpowers. In fact, this time was 
only a few years ago.
Since the era of liberalization in India 
began in earnest in 1991, the country has 
experienced consistent rates of growth 
in its gross domestic product (GDP) of 
around 6 to 7.5 percent per annum and has 
exceeded growth rates of 9 percent several 
years since 2005. For many years, India 
boomed. Well-known key drivers have been 
sectors such as information technology and 
services, for example the business process 
outsourcing industry that established call 
centers for customers worldwide. India 
became a major destination for interna-
tional investments, with German chemical 
companies, service (insurance) industries, 
and car manufacturers being prominent 
among them. Vice versa, Indian companies 
appeared on the scene as serious interna-
tional players, even in Europe. In an ironic 
twist to the old colonial relationship, cen-
tury-old Tata Industries bought British lux-
ury car manufacturer Jaguar.
«Incredible India» is not merely an 
advertising motto for the tourism industry – 
it seems to suggest far greater prospects. 
Expectations rose about India’s interna-
The current economic downturn is likely to remain  
a temporary phase: Positive fundamentals of  
the Indian economy – such as its huge market size 
and the country’s youthful demographic structure – 
remain valid.
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help to provide growth, namely education, 
health, and social support services. They 
point to the severe deficits that could lead 
to India losing the «demographic dividend» 
it currently enjoys: poor education services 
(except in a few top-level institutions) as 
well as severe health and nutrition issues – 
aside from the death toll – make substantial 
parts of the population less productive than 
they could be.
Drèze and Sen stress the need for sys-
tematic government health, education, 
and social sector policies. For example, 
they strongly argue in favor of social sup-
port programs such as the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), 
a cash-for-work program that has been crit-
icized by liberals for, among other reasons, 
its cost implications, but that in many parts 
of India has indeed led to rising incomes 
for poor rural people, especially women. 
Drèze and Sen look positively at Kerala, a 
state in southern India, which has achieved 
a high level of human development (by 
investing in education and health) despite 
rather low GDP growth rates. Within India’s 
mainstream political spectrum, Drèze and 
Sen are seen as standing closer to Congress 
Party positions, though they would most 
likely not want to be seen as supporting the 
current government directly.
More debates, loose ends
The debate between India’s master econo-
mists is currently receiving much public and 
media attention. It has become a slugfest 
that, at times, wrongly tends to reduce both 
sides to stereotypes: Whereas Drèze and Sen 
are sometimes criticized as being «against 
growth» (which they clearly are not), Bhag-
wati and Panagariya are viewed as repre-
senting a kind of market extremism (even 
though they clearly support well-designed 
social-support interventions). Personal ani-
mosities have entered the newspaper con-
tributions made by the authors themselves. 
Overall, however, the differences are more 
a matter of priorities in public policy. Nei-
ther side is seriously considering a radical 
move to turn away from the basic policy of 
liberalization and economic openness, nor 
to turn away from the policy of social sup-
port for disadvantaged groups, which India 
has been pursuing for some years now. Nei-
ther side fundamentally questions India’s 
democracy, even though it is recognized as 
a source of inefficiency, delay, and conflict, 
Very few Indians regard it as an outright bar-
rier to development.
Sometimes the fight is also about the 
pros and cons of certain practical policy 
proposals, informed in part by social and 
economic philosophy, but also in part by an 
impressive number of empirical research 
studies that are conducted to evaluate spe-
cific aspects of the problem. One such case 
is the issue of cash transfers for social sup-
port, a system that will soon be expanded 
(as opposed to the more traditional Public 
Distribution System, which sells subsidized 
food to the poor on the basis of «ration 
cards»). Bhagwati and Panagariya pre-
fer direct cash transfers to recipients as a 
means to ensure efficient distribution and 
to reduce corruption, whereas Drèze and 
Sen maintain that cash payments should 
not be introduced just to relieve the state 
of its duty to provide quality services. There 
are many more such debates. Although 
the basic economic philosophies behind 
them are of a global nature, and although 
experiences from abroad are sometimes 
used (such as the conditional cash transfer 
schemes introduced in Brazil), the debates 
retain a thoroughly Indian flavor, and 
arguments about particular policies being 
applied (or rejected) elsewhere in the world 
do not feature very prominently.
Of course, the four master economists 
discussed here do not cover the entire spec-
trum of Indian public opinion on economic 
and social policy. The political spectrum 
extends far beyond them, especially to the 
left of Drèze and Sen. There, commenta-
tors remain fundamentally critical of the 
policy of liberalization and view the coun-
try’s opening up to international trade and 
investment as being dangerous for the poor, 
as well as for India’s capacity to pursue sov-
ereign policies. Some of these voices come 
from the traditional left, represented by dif-
ferent political parties that claim the term 
«Communist» for themselves; others repre-
sent more modern, independent critics of 
globalization who finds support among civil 
society organizations, farmers’ associations 
and movements, etc.
Especially the latter groups can rightly 
point to one fundamental weakness of the 
arguments presented by Bhagwati and Pana-
gariya as well as Drèze and Sen: All these 
master economists, in their thinking about 
«development» and economic policy, have 
rather little to say about the agricultural 
By contrast, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen 
look at the Indian growth story of recent 
years in their book An Uncertain Glory. 
Their perspective could perhaps best be 
called «social-democratic.»
For Drèze and Sen, India’s main con-
tradiction is the persistence of poverty 
combined with rising inequality during an 
extended period of rapid economic growth. 
Although measuring poverty figures in India 
remains notoriously difficult, it is clear that 
even using the same Planning Commission 
figures as Bhagwati and Panagariya (above), 
the absolute number of Indians in poverty 
has declined far less – if at all – than the 
high GDP growth rates may suggest. At least 
270 million Indians remain in abject poverty, 
and many more millions are just beyond 
that threshold.
In its record of poverty reduction, India 
falls far behind China, while at the same 
time, inequality has rapidly grown. A signifi-
cant new middle class has emerged while a 
growing number of super-rich Indians has 
fueled the societal imagination – and the 
scorn and anger of intellectuals. Despite all 
efforts at affirmative action, Indian tradi-
tions of caste oppression continue to further 
increase inequality.
Drèze and Sen see the developmen-
tal process primarily as the need to grow 
human capacity instead of relying merely 
on economic growth. They also advocate 
supporting the systems that enable and 
Neither side is seriously considering a  
radical move to turn away from the basic policy of  
liberalization and economic openness.
All these master economists, in their thinking  
about «development» and economic policy, have 
rather little to say about the agricultural sector.
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sector. This is somewhat surprising – but 
perhaps also characteristic – for a country 
in which 70 percent of the population still 
lives in villages, and half of the popula-
tion is employed in the agricultural sector. 
Overall, developmental thinking in India 
seems to view the rural world primarily in 
terms of a labor reserve – at least once basic 
food needs are secured. It is also notable 
that urban development in India is strug-
gling to cope with rural-urban migration. 
Indeed, a common criticism (voiced promi-
nently by economists such as Jayati Ghosh) 
of India’s economic development is that it 
has led to «jobless growth.» In China and 
other East Asian countries, a large number 
of migrants were absorbed by a booming 
low-wage, export-oriented manufacturing 
sector. Apart from a few exceptions, such as 
the Tamil Nadu garment industry, no such 
dynamics exist in India. In order to solve 
this problem, Bhagwati and Panagariya 
advocate liberalization of the labor market 
and a more export-oriented policy, all of 
which should create more industrial jobs. 
Drèze and Sen favor securing the survival of 
the rural population and relieving distress 
migration by means of the NREGS cash-for-
work program. However, none of the authors 
systematically address the development 
needs of India’s rural population, nor offer a 
vision for the future of rural India.
Another loose end is the question of 
sustainability. Neither Bhagwati and Pana-
gariya nor Drèze and Sen take much notice 
of the environmental consequences of 
India’s GDP-focused model of economic 
growth – and of the limits to growth that 
exist in terms of the use of resources such 
as land, water, clean air, etc. India is get-
ting closer to its ecological limits, and some 
1 Bhagwati and Panagariya (2013: 35). The latest 
Planning Commission data published in July 2013 
(using a different type of metric) note a further 
decline in India’s poverty rate to 22 percent,  
from an even higher poverty rate of 37.2 percent  
in 2004 / 2005, see http: / / www.livemint.com / 
Politics / 1QvbdGnGySHo7WRq1NBFNL / 
Poverty-rate-down-to-22-Plan-panel.html.
of them have already been overstepped in 
parts of the country. Although environmen-
tal and rural activists have been pointing 
out these problems for years, a more com-
prehensive questioning of the very funda-
mentals of a GDP growth-based model of 
economic development has only emerged 
recently, for example by Ashish Khotari (see 
interview on p. 45 of this edition of «Per-
spectives Asia»). A debate on the «limits of 
growth» has not yet found many contribu-
tors in an India that, despite impressive GDP 
growth figures, continues to be confronted 
with mass poverty and growing inequality. 
Even India’s master economists dominat-
ing the public debates around development 
would be well advised to take greater note of 
these limitations. 
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The Indian Growth Story
Achievements and Future Challenges
Interview with Ashish Kothari
Undine Schmidt: The «Indian growth story» has received a lot of international  
attention. How would you describe the developments of the last decades?
Ashish Kothari: In the last five decades, but especially in the last 
20 years, economic growth has been the predominant way of look-
ing at development in India and a deep preoccupation for the politi-
cal decision-makers. Every day in the papers you read about India’s 
growth rate dropping or climbing up by half a percent. It appears that 
growth, which was meant to be a means to an end, has become an end 
in itself. Nobody speaks about the effects of 5 or 10 percent growth in 
GDP. We have come to a point that a growth rate of 5 percent is per-
ceived as a problem. What we have seen in the last few decades is that 
growth per se has not necessarily benefited people, in particular the 
poor – elsewise, why would the government put a law into place that 
provides food aid for 75 percent of the population? Clearly, this is not 
just an issue of redistribution: It is often argued that the fastest growth 
possible should be achieved, which then could be fairly distributed 
through things like the Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme.1 Yet, it 
is a structural phenomenon that this kind of growth – especially if it 
is led by the private sector – inevitably leads to greater inequalities 
and the deprivation or dispossession of already marginalized people. 
But the second, equally important aspect is that there are very clear 
signs of its lack of sustainability. If you admit the existence of ecologi-
cal limits, the concept of «sustainable infinite growth» is a contradic-
tion in terms. However efficient your technology, it will always have 
an ecological impact. In India, the government says that sustainable 
development is the primary focus of its plans, and there is actually 
nothing that tempers the growth logic. There are no indicators in place, 
for instance, that can help assess whether the development strategies 
are sustainable.
To our international readers, could you explain what happened in 1991,  
given that you describe this in your book as a turning point for the people and the  
environment in India?
Prior to 1991, or rather in the late 1980s, when some of the neolib-
eral economic policies were initiated, the predominant economic 
model was to a large extent a socialist model. A lot of the production, 
research, and development happened within the public sector. This 
was especially true for crucial sectors such as agriculture. Addition-
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ally, the domestic economy was given a much greater emphasis than 
the external economy and efforts were made to become relatively 
self-sufficient. As we were still largely dependent on gas and petrol 
imports, there had to be some balancing exports. This is not to say 
there were no problems; in fact, state-centered governance, ineffi-
ciencies, and corruption were rampant, but at least there was some 
attempt at being self-sufficient with a strong service and welfare com-
ponent. This changed substantially in 1991 with an opening up of the 
economy, making it much more led by foreign trade – exports and 
imports – and therefore outward-looking. A lot of sectors, including 
agriculture, were opened up – to both the Indian and the international 
corporate sector, and invitations and incentives were given for foreign 
direct investment. Constitutional and legal regulations created in the 
1970s and 1980s, for instance on indigenous people’s territories and 
the environment, were diluted and the state’s role declined.
Do these structural changes from 1991 also offer an explanation for the current  
economic crisis in India?
Yes. When the economic collapse happened in 2008, the Indian econ-
omy was somewhat less affected than several others. Up to that point, 
the Indian government had claimed how beneficial it was to open up 
India to the international economy. Then they argued that our econ-
omy was less affected because of the remaining protections and its 
supposedly inward-looking character. But that was a brief phase. In 
August of this year, the prime minister almost clearly admitted that 
we have no control. For the rupee to slip virtually 10–15 rupees against 
the US dollar in a few months – this had never happened before. And 
it is clear that the government is either not in control or does not want 
to be in control.
India is about to elect a new government in 2014. The discourse of economic develop-
ment and growth is predominant in the current election campaigns. Where do you see 
space for the issue of environmentally sustainable development in the elections?
Discussions and debates in the elections are highly simplistic and, 
consequentially, it is difficult to address the issue of sustainability. But 
land has become a major political issue, for instance. We need to get a 
sense across to people that the current model of development needs 
huge amounts of land acquisition, and that its infinite continuation is 
simply not possible or not desirable because it displaces unprivileged 
people, which leads to more questioning by the public. The Indian 
newspapers offer daily examples of communities protesting against 
displacement and evictions, and it is crucial to show alternatives to 
the current model. The passing of the Land Acquisition Bill2 shows 
that this issue is receiving significant attention. Addressing health is 
another way the issue of sustainability can enter the election cam-
paigns. More parents are concerned about pesticides and air pollution 
and the effects on their children. We must connect these concerns to 
the current development model. Recently, the World Bank published 
that environment-related damage, especially damage to human 
health, knocks 5 percent off of GDP in India. This effectively means 
a net growth of 0 percent. Such messages must be integrated into the 
elections – if not now, then certainly in the next one.
In its accounts on the Indian growth story, the Western media strongly focus on  
the supposedly growing and rising middle class. To what extent is that an appropriate  
representation, and how big is this «middle» class actually?
First of all, the term «middle class» comprises enormous diversity, in 
terms of economic but also other sorts of situations. It is clear that 
there is a section of maybe 50 to 100 million that has significantly ben-
efitted in the last 15–20 year from an income point of view. Looking at 
the upper middle class – those able to go to a shopping mall and buy 
foreign products – the Indian growth story appears to be a big suc-
cess. But if one considers the real purchasing power of what is said to 
be the wider middle class of maybe 200 million people, one quickly 
notices that they face serious economic problems. Plenty of middle 
class families are not able to afford pulses, lentils, or most fruits, or 
the values have changed such that they would prefer to buy consumer 
goods. This middle class is, in a sense, aspiring to be the upper class. 
In so doing, it has actually deliberately – or subconsciously, or uncon-
sciously – separated itself from the billion people who have not made 
it yet. So the issue of poverty is something that this middle class is 
either not willing to look at or not capable of looking at. There are 
exceptions, of course, and we need to work at expanding the num-
bers and the roles of those in the middle classes who are able to look 
beyond their own situations and status.
Globally as well as within India, the consuming class hardly carries the ecological  
costs of their consumption. Those who pay the externalities of this consumption are 
economically, geographically, and socially separated from the consumption class.  
How do you think the gap can be bridged between those?
First of all, communities from whom resources are being taken away 
need to be empowered to say «no.» We refer to this in our book as 
«direct democracy»: that every community has a central voice in what 
happens to its water, its land, its resources, and so on. As a conse-
quence, what the urban rich people are used to, in terms of long-dis-
tance access to resources, will not be there anymore. There are plenty 
of examples of empowered and protesting communities across India. 
Secondly, I think the urban rich consumer has to become much more 
aware of the impact of her or his consumption. The level of their 
awareness is very low. The best audience for this might be the chil-
dren, and education institutions should reach out to them. But there 
are also other possibilities. I have been arguing for the need of a «sane 
consumption line» or a «sustainable consumption line.» As we have a 
«below poverty» line and people are supposed to be above it, we also 
need a measure of an upper limit that includes water consumption, 
electricity, petrol, etc. Obviously, this is not to work according to «you 
pay more thus you get more» principle, because we simply cannot 
afford it – ecologically.
In your book, you mention the concept of environmental imperialism. You also  
mention the view of India being a microcosm of the world – accordingly, how does  
environmental imperialism play out within India?
Environmental Imperialism is a narrow environmentalist viewpoint 
that I certainly do not subscribe to. It attempts to try to protect the 
environment by looking at people as enemies and then pointing at 
the least privilege. For instance, for years we have been working on 
the marginalization of people in wildlife habitats, for the conservation 
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policies are such that they alienate the people or keep them out of the 
habitat. Another phenomenon observable among some urban envi-
ronmentalists is that they do not want to see slums or dirt or garbage. 
They will ask for – or will not say anything against – the displacement 
of people in poor slum areas. But of course, very large segments of 
environmental groups do understand these issues.
In your book you suggest a «radical ecological democracy» (RED) as an alternative. In 
this model a lot of importance is given to the local level. What would be the role of the 
federal state in such a scenario, in particular with respect to sustainable development?
National policies are currently disincentives to localization and eco-
logical democracy, for instance on agriculture. One example of heavy 
centralization would be the public distribution system of cheap sub-
sidized food to the poor. It is not only centralized in its decision but 
also based on narrow cultural preference for only rice and wheat – the 
grains come from a few regions in the country with high levels of pro-
duction. Based on current experiences on the ground, we have been 
recommending to localize the food distribution system by incentiv-
izing local farmers to produce locally and organically. A policy shift 
of this kind could greatly contribute to sustainable food production. 
Similar localization needs to happen with regard to water, energy, 
shelter, sanitation, livelihoods, education or learning, health, and 
political governance; there are already hundreds of initiatives across 
India showing that this is possible. We think that appropriate federal 
policy decisions, such as that on PDS suggested above, are essential 
for the transformation into a radical ecological democracy. Despite 
the importance of decentralization in RED, the central government 
will have to maintain a crucial role in at least three areas in the near 
future: besides the maintenance of large-scale activities such as the 
railway or the postal system, the federal state has to offer social ser-
vices to counter the high rates of poverty and promote social justice 
through social protection schemes. From our experience, localization 
itself is not sufficient to counter deeply engrained social divisions 
along the lines of caste, ethnicity, and gender.
Given that many environmental issues transcend borders, what role do you ascribe to 
the global level? What potential do you see for collaboration, in particular within Asia, 
on a sustainable pathway?
One level of collaboration is at the level of governance, whether it is 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the South Asian Associa-
tion for Regional Cooperation, Asia as a whole, or the Group of 77 at 
the United Nations. I am glad that some government such as Bolivia 
and Ecuador are raising the issue of sustainability and countering 
the growth paradigm not only within their region but also globally. In 
particular, the governments of India and China need to pay far more 
attention to this. But I do think that collaboration will happen, more 
on the level of people collaborating across national boundaries. The 
more we can build solidarity and cross-learning among people’s 
movements across South Asia – for instance, uniting the sustainable 
farming groups – the more we will be able to push the region as a 
whole toward sustainability and equity. There is not nearly enough 
transboundary collaboration happening.
In summary, what would your message be to readers within Europe, or Germany  
even? What role could people in Europe take in strengthening this transboundary  
collaboration?
The simplest task would be to financially facilitate this collabora-
tion – even for things such as exchange visits, people working across 
countries, etc. Unfortunately, independent of how much we talk about 
emerging economies, the financial resources are still elsewhere. Sig-
nificantly more complex would be the exploration of pathways of 
sustainability by establishing connections between, for instance, the 
de-growth movement in Europe and pathways of sustainability in 
India. The third and certainly most difficult task is for Germans and 
Europeans to understand the impact of their consumption. Given the 
limited ecological space on earth, Europe’s occupation of a dispro-
portionate chunk needs to change. This is the only way in which we 
can credibly talk about overcoming growth as a primary objective in 
India. Otherwise, people will understandably argue that we need to 
increase the size of the pie for the majority in Indian society to help 
them escape poverty. 
1 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme is a job guarantee 
scheme for rural Indians that was enacted by legislation on August 25, 2005. The 
scheme provides a legal guarantee for at least 100 days of paid employment every 
financial year to adult members of any household willing to do unskilled manual work 
related to public work at the statutory minimum wage of 120 rupees ($1.80) per day.
2 Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Bill, 2013, was passed on August 29, 2013 in the Lok Sabha (lower 
house of the Indian parliament) and on September 4, 2013, in the Rajya Sabha  
(upper house of the Indian parliament). The bill has provisions to provide fair  
compensation to those whose land is taken away, brings transparency to the process of 
acquisition of land to set up factories, buildings, or infrastructural projects, and  
assures rehabilitation of those affected.
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odisha, india
kolkata, india
Mount Niyam Dongar is a sacred place for the Dongria Kondhas, a people living 
in the Nyamgiri Hills of east India’s Odisha state. But it also holds a huge  
deposit of bauxite, valued at $2 billion by Vedanta Resources, a United Kingdom-
based metals company that wants to open a mine on the mountain.
Since 2005, Dongria Kondh villagers have resisted Vedanta’s efforts to develop 
the mine using demonstrations, court cases and – where necessary – direct  
action. Along the way they have enlisted the support of other local peoples, 
lawyers, and international nongovernmental organizations.
Odisha, known as Orissa until 2011, is home to 62 different tribal peoples,  
more than any other Indian state. Together they account for 22 percent of 
Odisha’s population.
Above: Here, four men from villages around Niyam Dongar stand atop a jeep they 
helped destroy after it was found bringing engineers hired by Vedanta to  
the mountain.
Mohammed Komrulhoda, 57, works as a rickshaw puller in 
the streets around Kolkata’s New Market area, starting 
before dawn and usually carrying on until 9 o’clock at night.
From Purvi Champaran, a small village in northern India’s 
Bihar state, he averages around six or seven customers 
a day, each paying between 10 rupees and 30 rupees for a jour-
ney – $0.15 to $0.50. His total daily earnings range between 
50 rupees and 100 rupees, from which he has to pay 30 rupees 
for the rental of his rickshaw. At night he sleeps 
 in a room shared with a dozen or so other men, paying 
90 rupees a month for his bed.
Two or three times a year he travels by train to visit his family 
in Bihar, journeys which each cost him around 5,000 rupees. 
Any money he has left after paying for food and his other 
living costs he sends to relatives in Bihar. He has five children, 
two of whom – his youngest daughters – remain unmarried 
because he cannot save enough money to give them dowries 
big enough to attract suitable husbands.
Top: On the streets for around 15 hours a day, most of 
Mohammed’s time is spent waiting for his next customer.
Middle: Mohammed takes an afternoon break with a cup of tea.
Bottom: Eating lunch at a street-side restaurant. Most days, 
Mohammed can only only afford a few chapati (unleavened 
flat bread), some dhal (lentils) and a bowl or two of rice. 
Occasionally he treats himself to a little chicken or mutton.
© Roberto Caccuri© Olaf Schuelke
«The impact of India’s growth has turned out to  
be very unequal, and what we need is an economy 
that everyone can benefit from. Also, I think that 
what Indian society is lacking in many areas  
is an intellectual approach to certain issues. What 
I mean by that is that we don’t look at things in 
depth and, hence, we are lacking sustainability in 
many areas. I feel that we need to evolve as a society 
and be more forthcoming and innovative toward 
the changes that will shape our future.»
Karan, 
Entrepreneur, 
New Delhi
«The current situation is alarming: 
Most members of my family  
are residing abroad, and they don’t 
want to come back. I believe we all 
must take political responsibility 
and participate in the upcoming 
elections. We need better jobs,  
rule of law, an end to corruption – 
and this must be equally enforced 
in all states of India. India is a 
big nation, and although this 
explains the number and diversity 
of problems, it is by no means  
an excuse. We cannot be divided if 
we want a future.»
Sudeepa, 
Accountant 
in an NGO, 
New Delhi
«I want to see a sustainably growing India, with a significant 
drop in corruption levels and the implementation of the rule of 
law. I also want the country to become a safe place for women.»
Shikha, Finance 
Coordinator in an 
NGO, New Delhi
«The last decade has witnessed increasing levels  
of globalization, and I believe that, overall, India 
has gained from this process. But India still needs 
to bring the population growth under control 
and to improve the human capital of her citizenry. 
Once a country has an educated citizenry that  
is capable of making responsible decisions and 
that has the ability to participate in public  
life in an informed manner, several key issues can 
be solved. The treatment of women is another 
concern. The media has publicized several  
rape cases. Such attitudes toward women reduce 
the level of their participation in public life and 
could lead to the involuntary retreat of women 
into the domestic sphere. I aspire to work particu- 
larly on issues relating to women’s empowerment.  
This is a population that I believe has borne 
some of the most horrific atrocities in the country. 
Finally, it is important for India to legislate  
a strong policy and implement it. This requires 
an efficient, transparent and accountable govern-
mental mechanism, which is currently lacking.»
Julu, 
Economics 
Student, 
Cochin (Kerala)
india
«In my opinion, concerning the economic 
development and political changes in  
Myanmar, there have been some changes in 
the urban areas but not in the rural  
areas, especially on the grassroots level. 
Their living standards and livelihoods have 
remained the same. In the next 10 to  
20 years, I hope we will have true democracy 
in Myanmar and there will be more  
social, economic, and political development 
at the grassroots level. In short, there  
will be more inclusive development in both 
rural and urban areas.»
myanmar
«I think Myanmar is copying 
Western development models, 
but we need instead to pro- 
mote development, which is 
more suitable to our people  
and culture.»
«Myanmar has a really unique 
opportunity for development in 
Southeast Asia, since it is strategi-
cally located between China  
and India – the two fastest-grow-
ing economies in the world – which 
is a dream for many investors.  
This provides many opportunities 
for growth and development in 
many sectors.»
«It is good that the government’s 
policy is focusing more on inclusive 
and rural development. Of  
course, although the previous 
government started doing rural 
development decades ago, we can 
see that the current government  
is increasingly focusing on  
doing bottom-up development in 
the country.»
Aye Aye Nyeing, 
Program Officer at 
Golden Plain, Yangon
«We cannot say that nationwide development is really happening in 
Myanmar. But if we can really apply the principles of democracy  
and have equality among all the people – regardless of religious 
background, ethnicity, and race – I think we will have a great oppor-
tunity for development. In order to achieve sustainable development, 
it is very important to think about how to manage the environment 
and the natural resources that we have in the country. I am  
learning about Indigenous Knowledge on Natural Resource Manage-
ment and I hope that I can contribute somehow by collaborating 
with rural communities on environmental protection and natural 
resource management in one way or another.»
Nan Ei Ei Phyu, 
Area Coordinator 
at Metta Foundation, 
Shan State
Khin Pa Pa Myo, 
Coordinator for 
Gaihahita – Youth 
Environmental 
Network, Yangon
U Sein Di Da, 
Head of Asia Anlinn 
Yaung Foundation, 
Sagaing Division
Khin Yu Yu Win, 
Project Officer at 
EcoDev, Yangon
Zeya Thu is a development expert, 
writer, and editor. He holds a 
master’s degree in International  
Development Studies from 
Chulalongkorn University in 
Thailand that was supported with  
a scholarship from the Heinrich 
Böll Foundation. He is the author 
of four books and writes, teaches, 
and speaks on development  
and leadership issues concerning 
Myanmar. He is director and 
deputy chief editor of – as well  
as columnist for – the leading na- 
tional newspaper, The Voice. He  
founded Myanmar Development 
Partners, a research and 
consultancy firm, to act as a 
bridge between international and 
Myanmar development partners. 
Myanmar: Development at a Crossroads
Challenges and Debates
Zeya Thu
simultaneously unfolded, following the 
emergence of a quasi-civilian government 
in March 2011.
After decades of isolation and back-
wardness, Myanmar is finally passing 
through a critical juncture in its history 
regarding development. The key question 
here is «How?» How do we go about attain-
ing the development that has until now 
eluded us? In order to address this impor-
tant question, we have to first take a look at 
the development models that Myanmar has 
experimented with in the past.
Previous and current  
models of development
After its independence, Myanmar embraced 
a welfare state with an agro-based economy. 
Although some successes were achieved in 
regard to infrastructure and agriculture, the 
welfare state failed to meet its ambitious 
objectives due to a lack of capital, political 
infighting, political instability, and a lack of 
human resources. The 1962 military coup 
paved the way for socialism, which meant 
a command economy, nationalization, and 
isolation. This was then overturned by the 
1988 demonstrations, when people across 
the country showed their discontent in 
light of impoverished conditions in every 
sector. The resulting military coup and 
military government declared a market-
oriented economic system, welcoming for-
eign direct investment and private sector 
actors, while still controlling all aspects of 
the economy. Although exports and foreign 
investments initially rose, the country was 
held back by an unstable exchange rate, 
environmental degradation, high inflation, 
the lack of a stable regulatory environment 
for business, corruption, the lack of meri-
tocracy, and mismanagement. Sanctions 
imposed by Western nations due to the 
political situation also contributed to the 
country’s poverty.
According to President Thein Sein, Myan- 
mar’s current development strategy is based 
on the three pillars of sustainability: 1) eco-
nomic sustainability; 2) social sustainabil-
ity; and 3) environmental sustainability.
The government has also mentioned 
«people-centered development» as part of 
its official strategy. According to Dr. Sai Mauk 
Kham, the first Vice President of Myanmar, 
people-centered development is «develop-
ment to satisfy the demands of the people.»
A specific framework for development, 
known as the «Framework on Economic 
and Social Reforms,» was approved at 
the planning commission’s third meeting, 
held on December 26, 2012, in Naypyidaw, 
Myanmar’s capital. Ten priority areas, which 
follow, were identified:
 Finance and taxation reforms
 Monetary sector reforms
 Liberalization of trade and invest-
ments regulations
 Undertakings for private sector devel-
opment
 Health and education sector reforms
 Plan for food security and agricul-
tural sector development
 Plan for governance and transpar-
ency
 Plan for upgrading mobile communi-
cation service and internet system
 Infrastructural development program
 Program for developing an effective 
and efficient governing system
Before the country began opening up again, 
the IMF, World Bank, and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB) had cut ties with Myan-
mar due to a lack of support and sanctions 
imposed by Western countries, particularly 
the United States, which holds considerable 
influence in these organizations. Since most 
of the sanctions against Myanmar have 
been dropped and the relationship with 
the United States is normalizing, the IMF 
and the World Bank are now re-engaging 
with Myanmar and have become important 
stakeholders.
The IMF has held discussions with the 
authorities and provided technical assis-
tance. The World Bank has also scaled-up 
its analytical and advisory services and 
resumed normal lending relations to Myan-
mar since its debts to the World Bank were 
cleared in January 2013. The ADB’s re-
engagement has likewise included assess-
ments of key sectors and the provision of 
technical assistance. And since Myanmar 
paid back its debts to the ADB in January 
2013, the ADB has also resumed lending to 
the country.
Myanmar’s steps – whether initiated 
independently or due to the international 
financial institutions’ influence – are in line 
with policy recommendations set by the 
Washington Consensus, such as trade and 
financial liberalization, increasing tax rev-
enue, currency devaluation, privatization, 
deregulation, and cutting budget deficits. 
Foreign direct investment-led growth with 
environmental and social considerations 
seems to be the dominant theme of the 
development strategy.
Despite its abundance of natural resour-
ces and its favorable geographical  
location at the crossroads of China, India, 
and Southeast Asia, Myanmar is one 
of the least developed countries in the 
region. However, decades of isolation and 
backwardness ended in 2011, when a 
quasi-civilian government under President 
Thein Sein took a path toward demo- 
cratic reform and economic development. 
But what kind of development is  
desirable and how will it be achieved? 
The article of Zeya Thu offers insights 
about the range of development models 
that are being discussed at the moment 
in Myanmar as they attempt to find 
solutions for achieving real sustainable 
development in the country.
Myanmar has been attributed with consid-
erable development opportunities since its 
independence in 1948; however, its potential 
has largely remained unrealized. According 
to official statistics, approximately one out of 
every four people in Myanmar is poor. And 
since having officially received the status of a 
«least developed country» in 1987, it has been 
unable to pull itself back up. Once renowned 
in Southeast Asia for its educational stand-
ards, the country now ranks among the 
lowest in the region. On the Human Devel-
opment Index, it ranked 149 out of 187 coun-
tries in 2012. In short, Myanmar has become 
a classic example of development failure 
despite its rich natural resources and favora-
ble geographical location.
To almost everyone’s surprise, Myan-
mar started to change unexpectedly a cou-
ple of years ago. The whole world watched 
in awe as economic and political reforms 
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The Myanmar Development Resource 
Institute was established to identify devel-
opment policy options and to train the 
personnel needed for the reform process. 
President Thein Sein also established the 
National Economic and Social Advisory 
Council, which includes intellectuals and 
key personalities from the business sector. 
These think tanks are designed to provide 
an independent and alternative source 
to public sector policy options. They also 
organize seminars and workshops where 
intellectuals, businessmen, government 
officials, as well as civil society leaders 
from inside Myanmar and abroad partici-
pate to generate ideas on key development 
issues that the country faces during the 
reform process.
Restored freedom of expression after 48 
years of draconian censorship and freedom 
from fear encourages policy debate and 
idea dissemination on the pages of newspa-
pers. However, one can say that Myanmar’s 
development path is not debated in the 
public arena at all. It is more or less imposed 
on the country by the government, albeit 
a well-meaning one. The public debate 
focuses more on the specificities of devel-
opment practice. Prominent examples are 
in the areas of large development activities, 
such as resource extraction, energy projects, 
and economic zones.
The Myitsone Dam is a case in point. 
The mega hydropower project was to be 
developed by a Chinese company, but faced 
widespread public resistance and was then 
eventually halted. This case was unprec-
edented, given Myanmar’s long history of 
ignoring the public and the power of Myan-
mar’s big neighbor, China. In the Dawei 
Special Economic Zone project, which is 
being developed in the south of the coun-
try, a proposed 4,000 megawatt coal power 
plant was canceled after facing public pro-
tests. In addition, the Letbadaung copper 
mine project – a joint venture between a 
military company and a Chinese investor – 
faced long and protracted local protests 
across the country. After the protest at the 
mining site was crushed, the issue was more 
or less resolved with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 
a prominent politician, intervening and 
securing improved terms and conditions 
for the country and compensation for locals. 
Letbadaung set the precedent for consider-
ing environmental and social impacts, in 
addition to the usual economic cost-benefit 
analysis, in current and potential develop-
ment projects across the country.
Though Myanmar’s political parties are 
active in development issues, they do not 
seem to have policies on development, or 
they do not present them explicitly. This 
may be due to the nascent nature of Myan-
mar party politics. Still young or having 
faced repression by the previous govern-
ment, they are still trying to function as a 
political party, which leaves little resources 
to develop specialized policies.
Present and future
With a long history of state dominance, 
proponents of reducing the government’s 
role can surely find many willing listeners 
in Myanmar. Having had enough of the 
state’s incompetence for half a century, the 
free market / free trade paradigm is not only 
a development model but may even work 
as an election slogan. However, it is not 
wise to completely dismiss the state’s role 
in development because – as is evident in 
some of its East Asian neighbors – a state-
driven development model can be success-
ful as well. Myanmar should strike a balance 
between the role of the state and the market 
to get the best out of its potential.
After consultation with the interna-
tional financial institutions and receiving 
their recommendations, Myanmar has to 
adopt a «listen to advice, but make your own 
choices» strategy. For instance, the IMF’s 
recommendation of keeping the budget 
deficit to 5 percent of GDP or less can be 
a double-edge sword. It pressures the gov-
ernment to cut spending in areas of lesser 
priority and may reduce wasteful spending, 
but it also restricts spending in key areas 
for growth and social importance, such as 
transportation, health, and education. As 
Myanmar is still in the process of construct-
ing the foundation upon which the country 
will grow, budget constraints will be a formi-
dable challenge.
Myanmar has to be aware of falling into 
the traditional trap of «catching up at all 
costs.» The «grow first, clean up later» stance, 
as exemplified, for instance, in China in the 
1980s and 1990s, is not an option. Pro-poor 
initiatives, despite moving in the right direc-
tion, need more momentum, as 26 percent 
of the population is poor and the per capita 
GDP – at $850 – is the lowest in the ASEAN 
region, even lower than that of land-locked 
Laos or war-torn Cambodia.
Debate over development
Since the new quasi-civilian government 
has taken over, Myanmar has welcomed a 
variety of ideas on development policies – 
from institutions such as the World Bank 
and the IMF to well-regarded critics of the 
Washington Consensus, such as Nobel lau-
reate Joseph Stiglitz. Myanmar has held 
numerous workshops and forums to gen-
erate ideas and policy debates, attracting 
world renowned academics – including 
some of Myanmar origin who have been 
living abroad for various reasons – to con-
tribute to the formulation of development 
policy. Stiglitz came to Myanmar for the 
first time in 2009 to advise the govern-
ment on poverty-reduction strategies. Dur-
ing his second visit in 2012, he spoke at a 
seminar entitled «An Agenda for Equitable 
and Sustainable Development for Myan-
mar» in Yangon. Also participating in the 
seminar were Professor Ronald Findlay, a 
former professor at the Yangon Institute of 
Economics, who is now at Columbia Uni-
versity, and Professor Hla Myint, a former 
economic advisor to the Myanmar govern-
ment and a renowned pioneer in develop-
ment economics. Another notable example 
is Francis Fukuyama, also an academic of 
global stature who visited Myanmar in 2012 
and lectured on private sector development 
through public sector reform.
Myanmar should strike a balance between the  
role of the state and the market to get the best  
out of its potential.
Capacity will have a final say on Myanmar’s  
development outcomes. Even if the policies are 
right, the implementation of them may not be.
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others in the region. It could, for example, 
focus on attracting foreign direct invest-
ment in labor-intensive industries to take 
advantage of its young population. How-
ever, power shortages (only 26 percent of 
the population has access to electricity) are 
a major obstacle for industrialization.
Tourism is a low-hanging fruit, as Myan-
mar is quickly becoming a hot travel desti-
nation. Nonetheless, promoting ecotourism 
instead of mass tourism can be an answer 
to the societal and environmental impacts 
that are associated with hordes of tourists.
Increasing public awareness of different 
development policy options – aside from 
the Washington Consensus recommenda-
tions that have already been put in place – is 
essential to empowering the people. With-
out this knowledge, the public might be 
at a disadvantage to effectively voice their 
opinions.
Last but not least is the capacity issue. In 
fact, capacity will have a final say on Myan-
mar’s development outcomes. Even if the 
policies are right, the implementation of 
them may not be. Both the capacities of state 
and non-state actors face similar deficien-
cies. Capacity-building at different levels 
and in different areas should be the priority 
for international donors and Myanmar.
The saying «better late than never» is 
particularly fitting for Myanmar’s develop-
ment. One hidden advantage of Myanmar 
being a latecomer is that it can learn from 
the mistakes of neighboring countries that 
have already experimented with different 
policy recommendations and models.
«Smart people learn from their own mis-
takes; geniuses learn from the mistakes of 
others.» Myanmar has to be both smart and 
a genius in choosing a development path of 
its own. After many lost decades, Myanmar 
cannot afford to do otherwise.  
Myanmar, a poor country rich with natural 
resources such as oil, gas, and gem stones, 
might be suffering from the resource 
curse – the tendency of countries with 
an abundance of natural resources to be 
less developed than countries with fewer 
resources. Natural resource management – 
including, but not limited to, building 
resource governance capacity in various 
levels of government; meeting international 
standards; conducting environmental and 
social impact assessments; incorporating 
local voices into decision-making processes; 
and transparently distributing revenues 
from natural resources to its citizens – will 
be key in dealing with the resource curse 
that Myanmar may currently be facing.
Encouragingly, Myanmar seems to 
be moving in a positive direction when it 
comes to natural resource management. 
It made a commitment to the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
which enhances revenue transparency 
and accountability in extractive sectors 
such as oil, gas, and mining. «The most 
important thing is to have completely 
transparent financial accounting to ensure 
everyone knows where the revenues from 
these extractive industries are going,» said 
President Thein Sein, who halted the con-
troversial Chinese-initiated Myitsone Dam 
hydropower project in 2011. For the first 
time in its history, Myanmar has a ministry-
level institution that will deal with envi-
ronmental conservation: the Ministry of 
Environmental Conservation and Forestry.
Foreign direct investment is currently 
concentrated in the energy, oil and gas, 
and mining sectors. Diversification of the 
economy is now possible since most of the 
EU and US sanctions have been dropped. 
Myanmar should find its place by figuring 
out how it can complement the needs of 
A Development Model for Myanmar
Interview with Kyaw Thu
Nwet Kay Khine: Is the future of Myanmar’s development openly debated in the  
country? Who is involved in the debates and what is mainly being discussed?
Kyaw Thu: Debates are intense between those who favor relaxing rules 
for investors and those who are trying to minimize environmental and 
societal impacts resulting from development. On one side, we have 
overseas investors and their local partners, who act on behalf of for-
eign companies, demanding rules and regulations because they create 
a predictable environment for investment. On the other side, we have 
local communities reacting to social injustices resulting from pro-
neoliberal changes. This is evident in the Myitsone mega-dam project, 
backed by Chinese investors; the Dawei special economic zone; the 
Letbadaung copper mine project, also backed by a Chinese company; 
and the China–Myanmar pipeline. These projects were successfully 
stopped, delayed, or altered in favor of the local communities after 
protests erupted; however, not every objection that the communities 
raise has been effective.
Some civil society actors, such as environmentalists, human rights 
defenders, social justice advocates, or however you may call them, 
have joined hands with the local communities. They have become key 
players who emphasize the importance of local participation, calling 
for meaningful consultations between investors and local communi-
ties, and stressing the importance of social licensing. In the long run, if 
poor local people do not benefit, growth across the country will stag-
nate. And if environmental degradation exacerbates poverty, then 
commercial-sector development cannot be sustained either.
Also, the international community’s role is very crucial in Myan-
mar’s transformation. Previously, Western countries were very critical 
of the military government. They never hesitated to condemn or take 
action against them whenever they saw wrongdoings. However, since 
the new government has taken over, their policy stance has shifted – 
from criticizing the government to engaging with them. Their priority 
now is to aid Myanmar’s reform by supporting capacity-building for 
the new government.
Viewing direct engagement with the Myanmar government as an 
inevitable task, at least for now, foreign players prefer not to disturb the 
normalcy of relations between the government and themselves. Govern-
ment policies can be unfair, particularly in the resources sector, but nev-
ertheless, the international community does not welcome civil society’s 
demands for justice. This attitude of trying to accommodate and encour-
age the government instead of helping the local poor is discouraging 
Kyaw Thu is the director of Paung 
Ku, an NGO with extensive net-
works to Myanmar’s civil society. 
A trained dentist who started his 
career in the public health sector, 
Kyaw Thu has gradually expanded 
the scope of his work to include 
more politically oriented (though 
non-partisan) mobilization, net-
working, and advocacy projects. 
With his organization Paung  
Ku, he focuses on strengthening 
civil society through small grants 
and capacity-building initiatives 
for local civil society organiza-
tions and networks across a range 
of sectors, but especially those 
sectors pertaining to agriculture 
and sustainable development; 
the environment; land rights and 
responsible investment; as well 
as those promoting peace, justice, 
and reconciliation.
Nwet Kay Khine is currently a 
PhD student in the International 
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and Peace at Mahidol University, 
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the Heinrich Böll Foundation in 
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Khine also holds an Erasmus 
Mundus Master in Journalism and 
Media within Globalization from 
Hamburg University.
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for human rights defenders. We saw this in the case of the Letbadaung 
copper mine, where international players focused on the reform pro-
cess while remaining silent on the injustices stemming from the mining 
project. Human rights violations in this area were by and large ignored 
by the international community. The voice of the affected communities 
and that of their supporters were threatened by this silence.
What do you think about the role of the media and think tanks in these debates?
The media is trying its best to cover development issues to inform the 
public and their respective targeted audiences. However, they lack 
the necessary skills to effectively analyze the current complex setting. 
Sometimes journalists are sent to cover seminars and other events 
where debate is heated, but they are unable to identify a takeaway 
message from the discussions. And sometimes the message may even 
be misinterpreted. The media is generally aware of these deficiencies, 
but they are still in the process of building up the necessary skills and 
competencies after decades of censorship.
Think tanks face their share of problems as well. The government 
has formed its own think tank, but it does not have regular meetings or 
an established mechanism by which members can feed policy advice 
to the government. The institution itself is struggling to provide input 
through the right channels and garner meaningful participation, 
rather than just being a government showcase.
Another example was Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s interest in estab-
lishing a think tank to deal with environmental issues. She talked to 
environmentalists and invited them to join the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) as party members, but everyone declined because 
they wanted to maintain their independence.
The role of experts, who can be independent voices, has been very 
important in many development issues. In the case of Letbadaung, 
many voices from across the spectrum – ranging from water experts 
and mining engineers to environmentalists and agriculturalists – could 
be heard. However, their voices were toned down and calls for adequate 
environmental protection measures were silenced by the release of the 
Aung San Suu Kyi-backed report, which recommended the continua-
tion of mining operations. It is understandable that experts withdraw 
from public debate when they fear possible repercussions. The media 
also does the same; they have not followed up on the copper mine 
since the investigation commission led by Aung San Suu Kyi released 
its report. The media has also shunned criticism against Aung San Suu 
Kyi for the sake of preserving their popularity. Due to the media and key 
politicians’ biases, local communities are left in the cold.
Which development model has the current Myanmar government adopted, who shaped 
it, and how do you assess its acceptance by the public?
The government focused on deregulation, privatization, and the 
reduction of government control over the economy. The new business 
environment accommodates the investors under a neoliberal doc-
trine. Although the term «neoliberalism» appears in the public sphere 
from time to time, do you think the majority of people residing in rural 
areas know what it means? It is not clear to the public what they can 
expect from neoliberal changes or how they can deal with the negative 
impacts. It is very clear, however, that local values and resources are 
increasingly being threatened by unjust privatization, and there are 
few mechanisms in place to protect the affected communities.
Moreover, some new policies are unfavorable for farmers and indig-
enous peoples in many aspects. For example, the 2012 land law gov-
erning vacant and fallow lands allows domestic and foreign businesses 
to occupy agricultural lands belonging to farmers and indigenous 
peoples. Under this new law, farmers who have been growing on 
hereditary land for their livelihoods can only possess land by means 
of official registration. As the registration process is not easily acces-
sible for rural people, the land policies put them at risk. In most cases, 
they are helpless. There are also similarities in the new environmental 
and investment laws. All of them are accommodating only to the busi-
ness side, at the cost of local communities. Although the rule of law 
is, in general, weak in Myanmar, the implementation of pro-business 
laws is carried out in a hasty manner. On the other hand, there is no 
urgency when it comes to installing proper mechanisms to protect 
the vulnerable.
Peace negotiations and the national reconciliation process will be 
undermined if indigenous lands continue to be threatened. If we are 
truly going to form a new Myanmar under a federal system, there is 
an urgent need to resolve the land problem. Peace might pave the way 
for fair resource sharing, but fair resource sharing can sustain peace 
in the long run. We proposed to the Myanmar Peace Center that the 
land issue be put on the table during peace negotiations in order to 
prevent future conflicts.
You have mentioned that pro-poor development is the campaign agenda of some politi-
cal parties. Are there any particular dissenting or supporting voices from political par-
ties concerning the current development model?
Yes. However, party policies shaped by the precautionary approach 
are not in place yet. Most of them believe that faster growth should 
be prioritized to reduce poverty as soon as possible. The problem is 
their understanding and acceptance of the GDP growth model, which 
has a proven record of having many serious problems. Furthermore, 
the top-down approach alone does not work in development. Notably, 
the idea of social licensing still has not been picked up by the parties. 
They do not recognize that local people can help businesses by solv-
ing problems together. Many famous politicians, including Aung San 
Suu Kyi, say it is inevitable for some people to sacrifice for the sake of 
collective prosperity. In the Dawei case, a parliament member from 
the NLD party said the social activists must be crushed because they 
are protesting mega development projects in the Dawei region. Many 
believe that being anti-development is intolerable. But we should not 
see the issues raised by local communities and civil society as being 
anti-development. Everyone wants to develop the country. But it is 
legitimate and good for us to have debates about what this means and 
the best ways to accomplish it. We can say that sacrifices are needed 
for collective prosperity, but then this must really be collective. That 
means benefits for everyone, including those who sacrifice to make 
way for some kinds of projects.
The politicians’ limited knowledge is a tremendous challenge in 
policymaking. Due to limited or weak capacity, most politicians are 
not aware of the UN framework regarding human rights violations 
committed by the business sector: «Respect, Protect and Remedy.» 
International governments and institutions supporting capacity 
development could help remedy this knowledge deficit.
A further shortcoming is that some ethnic parties only focus on pro-
moting development in their own region. They think that investment 
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will change the whole development landscape only for the better. It is 
dangerous if we do not find a solution on how to mitigate the side effect 
of these investments. Most of the MPs are not in such a position yet.
What are the impacts of current development policies on the communities, especially 
rural communities, and how are ethnic minorities affected and involved?
The current policies are business-centered, not people-centered. 
The current legal framework restricts the people’s choice rather than 
expanding it. In policymaking for investment, especially extractive 
industries, the question is: «What will be the benefit to the people?» 
But this question never gets answered. Myanmar is open to investors, 
but we do not have a clear spatial planning policy, a clear land policy, 
or sound environmental laws. Protection for indigenous peoples is not 
a government priority. And protection measures for poor rural com-
munities are even worse in the agricultural sector. Farmers have been 
struggling with debt problems for decades. One presidential advisor 
suggested that the farmers’ debt problem be eased by waiving over-
due loans. They could do this with the lump sum loans that they get 
from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank, but so far, there is no plan to use the 
money for improving the farmers’ situation. The farmers’ debt prob-
lem worsened when the government forced them to buy fertilizers and 
pesticides at a price higher than the market rate. These problems are 
not new. The problem is that policymakers are trying to solve the same 
old problems with the same old solutions.
Is there any space for local communities and ethnic minorities to react to the policies?
Communities react to the negative impacts of the development par-
adigm in many ways. So far, from my observations of several land-
grabbing cases, they have never chosen an aggressive way to respond. 
Their first step is usually to try to talk to the local authorities. If they do 
not get a proper response, they take their complaints to the regional 
and national levels. Some have even sent letters to the parliament and 
the president. If no result is achieved, only then do they choose to 
demonstrate on the streets. Some political parties, such as the NLD, 
are interested in expanding the space for local actors, including com-
munity-based organizations, as part of their political agenda. The 
88 Generation group also tries to help the people, especially in land-
grabbing cases. Civil society working on the ground is reaching out 
to every possible partner, including political parties. In some sectors, 
especially the agricultural sector, hundreds of civil society organiza-
tions have recently emerged. Farmers are forming associations, even 
though there is no regulation or law in place yet to do it under the 
current legal framework. As the International Labour Organization 
is helping to institutionalize labor unions, the farmers are also inter-
ested in being recognized as workers in the farming industry so they 
can legitimately function as an association. In Shan state alone, there 
is now a farmers’ network with around 8,000 members. But forming 
an association does not necessary mean that they have full freedom to 
act as an association. The new association law, which was drafted and 
debated in the parliament, is equipped to curb the power of associa-
tions by forced registration.
What is your future projection for Myanmar society if current trends go unchanged? 
Which scenarios are likely?
In Myanmar, the infrastructure is not ready to attract investors to the 
manufacturing and services sectors. Electricity is still scarce and water 
management is still inefficient. The most convenient way for eager 
investors is to go for resource extraction. Of course, land is a major 
resource as well. And policies are favorable for investors. If the trend 
goes unchanged, more cases of social unrest will happen – ultimately, 
it will slow down or damage reform.
As a civil society actor and social movement leader, what priority issues are you  
currently dealing with?
The urgency is in minimizing the adverse effects of neoliberalism and 
supporting local communities’ abilities to respond. So far, in all pre-
vious sessions, our parliament has passed 58 bills. These new laws 
will definitely have an impact on the people. We cannot intervene 
in every aspect of change, so my organization concentrates on pro-
moting social justice in the investment sector. We can be optimistic 
because awareness of sustainability is strong in the community and 
civil society networks are strong. On the other hand, the biggest chal-
lenge for civil society is that many issues are happening simultane-
ously and it has started to overwhelm us. We have realized that we 
should take some time to reflect on our work. Because of our limita-
tions and for efficiency’s sake, we need to consolidate our efforts. We 
have also seen that our space can be undermined by the opinions 
of influential leaders. Those who seek an alternative development 
model feel discouraged when Aung San Suu Kyi and the 88 Genera-
tion talk about their preference for a growth-led development model. 
That type of thinking is dangerous not only for the people but also 
for the activists who stand with the local communities to fight against 
the unfair rules of the game. Now, Myint Myint Aye, a lady from Let-
badaung, has been arrested for her actions against the copper mine. 
We have a list of other detainees in jail. To be precise, there are 
120 people who are in prison for protesting against the investors. All 
arrests are related to the China–Myanmar gas pipeline, land acqui-
sition in different provinces, and other investment projects. Still, 
many other arrests are unreported or underreported. Companies are 
accusing farmers of spoiling community interests. And the police are 
always in the same boat with the companies, so it is no surprise that 
hundreds of farmers’ cases go unreported.
What needs to be achieved in the next two years before the government might change?
People are thinking inside the box of bipartisan politics. The majority 
hate the ruling party – the Union Solidarity and Development Party 
(USDP) – for their affiliation with the junta. To reject the USDP, people 
are tempted to vote for the NLD. But this scenario is likely to change 
in the next election. People will judge the candidates based on their 
commitments and efficiency but not on partisan politics. Some new 
faces, especially from the ethnic regions, are preparing to participate 
in the coming election. Young faces, especially from Kachin, are eager 
to be elected as individual candidates. Fewer people will vote due to 
personal affiliations in the future. Rather, they are likely to choose 
someone who can best perform as their representative. 
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myanmar Sin Ko Ko Oo, 13, at the helm of his father’s long-tail boat on Shan state’s Inle Lake in central 
Myanmar. His father, tired after nearly a month of non-stop early morning work ferrying visitors 
around the lake for the Phaung Daw Oo Pagoda Festival, is dozing in the bow of the boat.© Richard Koh
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Donor Accountability and 
Local Governance
Development Assistance to  
the Cambodian Land Sector
Mark Grimsditch
influence of donors has often proved to be 
limited in the face of weak local governance 
and lack of political will. 
Setting the context:  
Land in Cambodia
The nature of land ownership in Cambodia 
has changed drastically over the last four 
decades. After the Khmer Rouge took power 
in the early 1970s, all private ownership was 
abolished and land became state property. 
Land remained state property after the fall 
of the Khmer Rouge and the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea in 
1979. Toward the end of the 1980s, private 
ownership of residential land was legalized, 
and in 1992 a new land law was passed that 
laid the foundations for the growth of the 
land market in Cambodia.2
This rapid transition from centralized 
Marxist-Leninist state to a capitalist free 
market had significant impact on land 
holdings. According to one report, the land 
reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
«set the stage for land grabbing and power 
abuses» as land became a valuable com-
modity.3 As shortcomings in the 1992 Land 
Law became apparent, some donors made 
future assistance conditional on the adop-
tion of a new law. This was passed in 2001 
and soon after, multi- and bilateral donors 
increased support to the land sector, seeing 
an opportunity to support reform.
Although the legal framework related 
to land is now relatively well-developed, 
implementation is often lacking. This is 
complicated by the fact that most landown-
ers lack definitive documentation for the 
land that they hold, leaving them vulner-
able to conflicts and eviction. As a result, 
violations of land rights have become one 
of Cambodia’s most pressing human rights 
concerns. In 2012 a local rights organiza-
tion reported that it had recorded disputes 
involving more than 400,000 people in the 
12 provinces where it has offices.4
Land conflicts have been a concern 
since the 1990s, but pressure on land-
owners has intensified as investment has 
flowed into Cambodia and land values have 
increased. Large-scale evictions of urban 
poor communities have occurred, often 
to make way for real estate development. 
One local organization estimated that more 
than 150,000 people were evicted in Phnom 
Penh between 1990 and 2011.5 In rural areas 
thousands of families have lost land to pri-
vate companies that have been granted 
expansive land concessions for develop-
ing agro-industry, often in breach of legal 
requirements. While land is being consoli-
dated in the hands of the powerful, wealthy, 
and well-connected, landlessness has 
become a national problem. A 2008 study 
found that 21 percent of households were 
landless, and a further 45 percent owned 
less than 1 hectare of land.6
The World Bank and  
Cambodia – A troubled  
relationship
Against this backdrop, donor-funded pro-
grams have sought to improve tenure 
security by supporting Cambodia’s land 
administration and management systems, 
and in 2002 the Land Management and 
Administration Project (LMAP) commenced. 
LMAP was implemented by Cambodia’s 
Ministry of Land Management, Urban 
Planning and Construction (MLMUPC), 
financed by the World Bank, and received 
technical support from bilateral donors in 
Germany, Finland, and Canada.
The Project aimed to improve tenure 
security and promote the development 
of land markets by developing regulatory 
frameworks, building the capacity of the 
Cambodian Ministry, and strengthening 
dispute-resolution mechanisms. The main 
focus was to establish a land registration 
program to systematically issue land titles 
across Cambodia.7 Up to August 2012, 
almost two million land titles were issued 
by LMAP and its successor program.8 How-
ever, although the program enjoyed consid-
erable success in titling rural areas, this was 
not matched in urban areas. In 2009, fol-
lowing a series of forced evictions in Phnom 
Penh, local and international NGOs raised 
concerns that legitimate landholders were 
being denied access to the system because 
their land had been targeted for develop-
ment.
In 2009, residents living around Boe-
ung Kak Lake filed a request with the World 
Bank Inspection Panel for an inspection of 
the Land Management and Administration 
Project. Located at the center of Phnom 
Penh, Boeung Kak Lake was home to more 
than 4,250 families. Many had lived there 
for years and had potentially strong claims 
as legal possessors under the Land Law. In 
March 2006 the lake was designated an 
adjudication area of the land project. This 
should have been followed by an assess-
ment of all ownership claims within the area, 
which in turn would allow the issuance of 
land titles. However, no assessment hap-
This article looks at World Bank and Ger-
man land sector support and highlights 
the challenges these actors have faced in 
ensuring effective implementation of land 
sector reform.
Following the collapse of the Khmer Rouge 
in 1979, Cambodia was seen as a pariah 
state by much of the international com-
munity – through the 1980s itreceived aid 
from just a handful of states. This changed 
in the early 1990s after Cambodia adopted 
a multi-party system and held elections. 
Donor money has since poured into Cam-
bodia and the country is now heavily 
dependent on official development assis-
tance. According to one analysis, from 2002 
to 2010, for every dollar spent from the 
national budget, Cambodia received an 
average of $0.94 in aid.1 Cambodia’s donors, 
or «development partners,» provide sup-
port across a broad range of sectors – from 
education and health to infrastructure 
development and legal reform. Donors, 
which include the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, and bilaterals from 
Germany, Finland, and Canada, have con-
tributed significantly to the land sector. 
With this support, Cambodia has made 
notable progress in legal reform, institu-
tional strengthening, and the development 
of land administration and management 
systems. However, land conflicts and 
development-induced displacement con-
tinue to plague the country.
Donors to the land sector have come 
under increasing pressure from civil society 
to acknowledge these concerns and push 
for improved implementation by govern-
ment counterparts. Safeguard systems, 
milestones, monitoring indicators, and var-
ious other mechanisms are in place, but the 
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630 families received land titles. However, 
3,500 families had already left the area and 
accepted the meager compensation offered, 
and several dozen families were denied 
land titles, as their plots were outside the 
12.44 hectare area.
The Boeung Kak Lake case exposed the 
challenges that are presented by donor-
funded projects in the land sector. For a 
number of years, LMAP was held up as a 
successful example of donor engagement, 
with donors often referring to the large 
number of titles issued as evidence. How-
ever, the project was designed in a way that 
it avoided land that was in dispute or of 
unclear status; in some cases, where pow-
erful interests were at play, LMAP failed to 
properly assess resident’s land claims, and 
thus left them exposed and vulnerable to 
eviction.
Boeung Kak Lake residents lay in the 
path of a multi-million-dollar develop-
ment linked to a high-ranking official, and 
although safeguard mechanisms were 
activated and the World Bank eventually 
attempted to push for a resolution to the 
dispute, the interests involved were too 
great. In this context of weak rule of law and 
endemic corruption, the rights of ordinary 
citizens often come second to the inter-
ests of those with power and influence. In 
this case, even the World Bank, which is a 
major donor to the Cambodian govern-
ment, found its leverage to be limited. The 
collapse of LMAP and suspension of World 
Bank lending illustrates well the limitations 
of donor influence when faced with a lack 
of political will on the part of the borrower.
Germany’s milestones
Prior to its cancellation, LMAP had already 
begun to transition to the Land Admin-
istration Sub-sector Programme (LASSP), 
under which land registration continued. 
Germany and Finland continued to sup-
port LASSP, whereas Canadian funding 
ended in mid-2013. Germany’s Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) is responsible for bilateral official 
development cooperation, and currently 
commissions the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)13 to 
implement Cambodian bilateral land sec-
tor support.
The LMAP Inspection Panel investiga-
tion and civil society advocacy also put Ger-
man bilateral assistance under the spotlight. 
After World Bank involvement in the land 
sector ceased, attention turned to German 
bilateral assistance. A month after LMAP 
was cancelled by the Cambodian govern-
ment, BMZ announced in October 2009 
that future land sector support would be 
contingent on strengthening human rights 
in the land sector. This took the form of 
five milestones that cover issues including 
indigenous land rights, implementation of 
a new framework for dealing with informal 
settlements in urban areas, and drafting of a 
housing policy.14 Although these milestones 
were not achieved in full, Germany contin-
ued to support the land sector and a new 
program was approved.15
This new Land Rights Program runs 
from 2012 to 2015 and is subject to a further 
set of milestones that cover a number of 
issues related to land registration, includ-
ing a commitment to speed up the process 
and to address the issue of exclusions from 
the system. The Cambodian government 
was required by the German counterpart 
to develop a plan by July 2012 that would 
describe and define how to register areas 
that have been excluded from systematic 
registration and on how to avoid future 
exclusions.16 In May 2012, a draft document 
was circulated by the Ministry of Land Man-
agement, which outlined a very brief plan 
for speeding up systematic land registra-
tion and solving the problems of exclusion.17 
However, this draft document was only one 
page, with just half of that page devoted to 
the issue of speeding up registration and 
avoiding exclusions. Eventually, no further 
consultations were held with civil society.
The Boeung Kak Lake case highlighted 
the problem of exclusions from the titling 
system, but civil society groups also iden-
tified numerous other cases of exclusion 
across the country. The result of such exclu-
sions is that many thousands of people 
have been left in limbo, with their land left 
untitled, and thus exposed to future land 
conflict or eviction. In 2012, BMZ commis-
sioned a human rights assessment of the 
German land sector assistance. Although 
the study found that the program con-
tributes to the realization of the rights to 
adequate food and housing, it also identi-
fied numerous challenges and highlighted 
a lack of accountability on the part of the 
MLMUPC and development partners, and 
a lack of transparency in some areas of the 
program, especially in the selection of adju-
dication areas.18
Cambodia has achieved notoriety for 
its poor land rights record, and as a result, 
BMZ has come under pressure from Ger-
man parliamentarians and NGOs, as well 
as local and international NGOs working in 
pened, and when adjudication maps were 
displayed in January 2007, all owners were 
listed as «unknown.» Four days later, it was 
announced that the land had been leased by 
the government to a private company.9
Soon after, residents were pressured to 
vacate their homes in return for compensa-
tion of $8,500 or a replacement apartment 
on the outskirts of the city. Many accepted, 
as they feared they would otherwise be 
evicted and receive nothing, but more than 
800 refused and resisted eviction. After 
exhausting all available remedies without 
any result, Boeung Kak Lake residents went 
to the World Bank Inspection Panel, claim-
ing that poor implementation and inad-
equate supervision of LMAP caused them 
harm. The Inspection Panel’s investigation 
found serious breaches of the World Bank’s 
safeguard policies.10
Prior to the publication of the Panel’s 
report, the World Bank sought to negotiate 
a resolution to the case with the Cambodian 
government. However, the government was 
not willing to negotiate and responded by 
cancelling the project.11 The reasons for this 
refusal to negotiate are open to speculation, 
but it is no doubt relevant that the company 
that received the lease for the lake area is 
owned by a well-connected and influential 
ruling-party senator.
Finally, in August 2011, the World Bank 
announced a suspension of all future lend-
ing to Cambodia until this case was ade-
quately resolved. Soon after, Cambodia’s 
prime minister announced that 12.44 hec-
tares of land would be cut from the devel-
opment area and granted to the remaining 
residents.12 This was a tremendous victory 
for those who held out and fought for the 
recognition of their rights, and more than 
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is a development priority, the prevalence 
of widespread conflicts, displacement, and 
landlessness indicates that a commitment 
is lacking. As Cambodia seeks to move away 
from aid-dependency, the government has 
promoted investment, including in land 
and natural resources. However, in Cam-
bodia’s current context of weak rule of law, 
where the elite are able to behave with rela-
tive impunity, such investment comes with 
considerable risk. One symptom of this 
is that urban poor communities, such as 
those living at Boeung Kak Lake, are pushed 
from their homes to make way for high-end 
developments.
When confronted with broader con-
cerns about ongoing evictions and other 
land rights violations, donors have often 
focused on the technical aspects of their 
support, avoiding sensitive issues that may 
result in the deterioration of relationships 
with government counterparts. Although it 
may be prudent for donors to focus on areas 
where they have a realistic chance of making 
progress, concentrating on isolated activi-
ties and outputs fails to take into account 
the broader reality of what many see as the 
continuing deterioration of respect for land 
rights in Cambodia. This, in turn, will inevi-
tably lead to criticism that donors are com-
plicit in the state’s failings.
It is important not to lose sight of the 
broader context of the challenges that 
Cambodia currently faces with regard to 
land and natural resources. Land conflict, 
displacement, and landlessness are ever-
present threats to the livelihoods of many 
thousands of Cambodians, and with these 
come the risk of social unrest. Although 
there are no simple solutions to the complex 
scenarios outlined here, it is clear that there 
needs to be a shift in the current paradigm. 
Cambodia, who asked for safeguards and 
mechanisms that ensure the participation 
of concerned communities. Further, the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) expressed 
their concern regarding German engage-
ment in the Cambodian land sector in their 
Concluding Observations to the Federal 
Republic of Germany19 on May 20, 2011: 
«The Committee is concerned that the State 
party’s development cooperation program 
has supported projects that have reportedly 
resulted in the violation of economic, social 
and cultural rights, such as in the case of the 
land-titling project in Cambodia (art. 2.1, 11, 
22 and 23).» In a 2011 meeting, a senior BMZ 
official acknowledged this and expressed 
concern that there was a risk that German 
development cooperation and the Ger-
man government could «appear as being 
involved in human rights violations occur-
ring in the Cambodian land sector,» making 
engagement in the sector a political risk for 
Germany.20 GIZ has been criticized for miss-
ing opportunities to engage civil society on 
their concerns around land registration 
and for not acting soon enough or taking 
decisive action to address shortcomings in 
the implementation of land sector reforms. 
This was despite repeated attempts by civil 
society to bring these issues to the atten-
tion of donors through meetings, letters, 
and forums such as the Technical Working 
Group on Land. BMZ has since developed 
milestones that address some of the issues 
that have arisen in recent years, but, as 
mentioned above, these milestones have 
not been met in full and the impact of this 
process remains to be seen.
Cambodia’s failure to achieve these key 
monitoring indicators has had little impact 
on donor support, and aid commitments to 
Cambodia have continued to increase year 
on year. This has led to criticism of donors 
in the press and from civil society, and has 
highlighted the very significant challenges 
of supporting reform in the face of limited 
commitment on the part of Cambodia’s 
decision-makers.
Donor influence and  
local governance
The experiences of the World Bank and BMZ 
provide an illustration of the challenges 
related to donor-supported land sector 
programs. Although the Cambodian gov-
ernment has stated that land sector reform 
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kh / cdc / Donor_Development_Cooperation_ 
Programs / Germany / Negotiation_on_Development_ 
Cooperation_2011 / annex4.pdf  
(accessed October 2013).
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Challenges for Poverty Reduction and 
Sustainable Development
A View from Laos
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic is one of the poorest countries in the world. Three-
quarters of the population is rural and lives from the land. Those living in the more remote 
parts of the country have limited access to education, jobs and healthcare. Malnutrition 
remains a problem. Over the last 10 years, Laos has experienced dynamic changes. The 
economy is growing at an average of 7.5 percent annually and there has been some suc-
cess in combating poverty. The government has set a goal of getting Laos off the United 
Nations’ Least Developed Country list by 2020.
But many observers are still concerned. The country’s progress depends on a rapid 
rise in direct foreign investment and the exploitation of natural resources. Unregulated 
investment in mining, agribusiness, and large-scale hydroelectric power plants to provide 
neighboring countries with electricity has at times led to forced migration and deprived 
rural communities of their livelihoods. The United Nations warns that most of the popu-
lation is dependent on ecosystems that are being damaged beyond repair by the current 
development.
In the run-up to the Asia-Europe Meeting and the non-governmental Asia-Europe 
People’s Forum (AEPF), which took place in the Laotian capital, Vientiane, in 2012, civil 
society and local communities organized a process for extensive discussions and consulta-
tions aimed at formulating development goals for Laos. The process was led by agrarian 
and education expert Sombath Somphone, and more than 1000 men and women of all 
ages and of diverse backgrounds contributed their views and experiences. Somphone, a 
member of the AEPF organizing committee, presented the results during the AEPF con-
ference, where he also gave the opening address. Two months later, Sombath Somphone 
was abducted in Vientiane and has not been heard from since. In this speech, he describes 
the communal vision for fair and sustainable development in his home country.
Speech given by Sombath Somphone at the  
9th Asia-Europe People’s Forum (AEPF),  
October 16–19, 2012, Vientiane, Laos (excerpt)
Excellency Dr. Thongloun Sisoulath, Deputy Prime Minister of the Lao PDR, respected 
friends and colleagues from Laos, Asia, and Europe, Ladies and Gentlemen,
What an honor and what a pleasure it is for me to be welcoming you all to our small 
country, a land of gentle people with big hearts. I am especially honored to represent 
Laos at this Asia-Europe People’s Forum to address you today and to share with you 
some thoughts on how we can together work toward reducing poverty and building a more 
sustainable future for ourselves and for our children.
cambodia Siem Reap is one of Cambodia’s fastest-growing cities, filled  
with bustling hotels, shops, and markets. But along its  
outer edge, away from the tourist attractions and hectic 
commercial districts, lie natural, dry, unkempt grasslands, still 
untouched by development.
Scrubland and lakes lie along the sides of Plov Lek 60 Road. At 
its end, the road abruptly turns into a field. Early each day,  
local people gather on the road to exercise. As dusk falls, traders 
set up stalls and impromptu restaurants along its pavement. 
Local people come out to picnic, date, or just enjoy the scenery.
Below: A young couple enjoy a picnic besides Plov Lek 60 Road 
on the outskirts of Siem Reap.© Miti Ruangkritya
Sombath Somphone is an agra- 
rian expert from Laos. After 
Laos independence he worked 
on sustainable farming and food 
security. Later he introduced the  
use of participatory rural 
appraisal techniques in Laos.  
In 1996 he established the 
Participatory Development 
Training Center (PADETC) which 
aims to train young Lao people  
and local government officials in 
community based development. 
For his achievements he  
received the prestigious Magsay-
say award, the Asian equivalent 
to the nobel prize. On 15th 
December 2012 he disappeared 
when he was on his way home in 
Vientiane.
For more information see:  
http: / / sombath.org /
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The human race has made enormous progress in science and technology in the past century. 
We have built better and better infrastructures, better systems of communication, watered 
the deserts, sent men to the moon, advanced medical science, and also built enough weap-
ons of mass destruction to blow up our planet if we want to. In the process and without 
doubt, our lives have physically become more comfortable and more convenient. In fact, 
sometimes too convenient and too comfortable, especially for the majority living in the 
more developed parts of Europe, and for the more well-off even in the poorer parts of Asia. 
However, for the poor, the disenfranchised, the benefits of progress have yet to reach them.
Our improved physical comfort has weakened our minds. We have become less caring, 
less compassionate, and more self-centered. We let our emotions rule our heads instead 
of relying on our intelligence and wisdom. We let our selfish desires and pursuit for im-
mediate gratification blind us to what is really important and essential for our personal 
happiness and for the well-being of our families and societies.
How did we get there?
I strongly feel that it is our poor education system and badly conceived development 
model that got us here. Our modern education system is modeled from the West, and is 
quite divorced from reality. It is too compartmentalized and segregated, focusing on tech-
nical content, and not [giving] adequate attention to critical thinking and analytical skills.
The development model is not balanced, not connected, and definitely not holistic. 
We focus too much on economic growth and ignore its negative impacts on the social, 
environmental, and spiritual dimensions. These unbalanced development models are the 
chief cause for inequality, injustice, financial meltdown, global warming, climate change, 
loss of bio-diversity, and even loss of our humanity and spirituality. We are blinded by the 
power of money and let the corporations rule the world and even override the power of 
the state. Ordinary people, and civil society, have very little say in all this. Their voices are 
not heard loud enough by the government and by the corporations.
How to get out of this situation?
Certainly pointing fingers will not bring us together. Asking the industrialized nations that 
are now already consuming up to three to five planets to care and share more will not 
work. They have been addicted to a way and style of living for so long that they will not 
easily want to change. Asking the developing nations that also aspire to have the kind 
of lifestyle of the developed world will also not work. They do not want to be left out of 
enjoying the material benefits and comforts that have been denied them for so long. Get-
ting out of this dangerous stalemate requires three major changes.
First and foremost, it is necessary to transform the present power structure. We 
cannot afford to allow the big corporations to continue dictating to our governments 
the kinds of investment they should make. And we cannot continue to have governments 
continue to listen to the power of money over the voices of the people and civil society. 
These three parties – state, corporations, and civil society – should work together on a 
more equal basis and with mutual respect and shift the course of development to a more 
balanced one. This should be done regardless of whether we live in Laos, Asia, Europe, 
or any other continent.
Secondly, we need to shift our thinking and adopt a different model of development. 
This new model should stress the balance and interconnectedness between the four dimen-
sions or pillars of development, namely: economy, nature, society, and governance. The 
development of one pillar should not have negative impact on any of the other pillars. If it 
does, the losses on any other pillar should be factored in as additional capital loss.
Thirdly, we need to give more space for the ordinary people and allow them to be the driv-
ers of change and transformation. Listening to the voices of the young is especially crucial. 
Their ideas and aspirations for sustainable development should be given due considera-
tion; after all, the future should be theirs to make.
Hearing from the Lao people
We in Laos have already taken the first step toward this direction. To foster solidarity 
against poverty and for sustainable development in Laos, civil society organizations in 
Laos have teamed up with the government and mass organizations to conduct consulta-
tions in all provinces. The joint fieldwork has instilled a strong sense of trust among civil 
society organizations and mass organizations and broken the wall between civil society 
groups and government representatives.
Lao people understand development in a more holistic way – poverty can be physical, 
social, and emotional. In Lao language there is one word that sums this up very well. It 
is called khuam tuk, which means «all forms of suffering.» Its opposite is called khuam 
suk, which means «happiness» or «contentment.» The Lao often equate happiness or 
contentment with sustainable development or sustainable livelihoods, and sustainable 
development is a condition that arises only when there is balance between the four pillars 
of development – economy, nature, society, and governance.
For each of the four pillars of development, the [Lao] people  
would like to stress the following:
 Economic pillar: Improvement of household or local economy by focusing on 
sustained income generation, employment creation, and strengthening of a self-
sufficient economy. Economic development should not lead to debt accumulation, 
which is the main cause of poverty. Economic development and promotion of 
investment should also not undermine people’s land ownership, which is the foun-
dation for food security and a sustainable household and local economy.
 Social pillar: Improving social security and development needs to focus on im-
proved access to good healthcare, better quality of education, and strengthen-
ing social solidarity. More attention should be paid to combating negative social 
phenomena, such as erosion of family and moral values, which give rise to drugs 
abuse, gambling, and risks to HIV / AIDS infection, especially among young people.
 Environmental pillar: More focus needs to be given to the protection and conserva-
tion of Laos’ natural resources and environment through reducing the degradation 
of forests, safeguarding water resources, and preventing the release of toxic chemi-
cals into land, water, and air by unregulated urban and industry development.
 Governance pillar: To strengthen governance and the rule of law, the focus should 
be on improving people’s understanding of the law and their rights. This must go 
hand in hand with strengthening the enforcement of the law to avoid abuse and 
non-implementation. We should also enhance the protection of peace and improve 
the transparency of governance by promoting participation in decision-making, 
monitoring, and reporting of development activities by all stakeholders.
We have heard the voices of the people, including young people, loud and clear. The ques-
tion is: How do we now translate these clear voices into action? We hope what we have 
done in Laos will be some food for thought and stimulate discussions at the Forum. Over 
the next few days, we will have the opportunity to exchange ideas and hear and learn from 
the experiences from our colleagues and jointly work toward reducing poverty and build-
ing a more sustainable world in solidarity.
Thank you very much for your kind attention. 
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